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Labor unions are active again - but this time as capitalists. The
potential strength of union pension funds has long been noted,1 but
until recently unions have held their stock passively or invested in
union-friendly companies.

In the 1990s, however, unions have

become the most aggressive of all institutional shareholders. 2 In
most cases, it is hard to find a socialist or proletarian plot in what
unions are doing with their shares. Rather, labor activism is a
1. See I'r:rER F. DRUCKER, THE PENSION FUND REvoLunoN (1996) (originally
published as THE UNSEEN REvoLunoN: How PENSION FUND SOCIALISM CAME To
AMERICA (1976)); JEREMY RlFK1N & RANDY BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN:

PENSIONS, POLITICS, AND POWER IN THE 1980s (1978).
2. See Joann S. Lublin, 'Poison Pills' Are Giving Shareholders a Big Headache, Union
Proposals Assert, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1997, at Cl. For general discussions of labor unions'
shareholder activism, see Aaron Bernstein, Labor Flexes Its Muscles - As a Stockholder,
Bus. WK., July 18, 1994, at 79 (reporting that union-mounted proxy fights have quadrupled
since 1992); Laura M. Litvan, Unions Take Stock in Companies, lNvEsroR s Bus. DAILY,
Dec. 11, 1997, at 1 (discussing current union shareholder initiatives); Paul Sweeney, Clash by
Proxy, AcRoss THE BoARD, May 1, 1996, at 21 (discussing labor union activism during the
1996 proxy season).
'
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model for a.Ily large institutional investor attempting to maximize
return on capital. Unions, union pension funds, individual union
members, and labor-oriented investment funds are using the
corporate voting process to push for a wide variety of changes in
corporate governance.

These range from redemption of rights

plans3 to implementation of confidential shareholder voting to caps
on executive pay.
This shar eholder activism by unions requir es a maj or
realignment of the traditional ideologies of shareholder, worker,
and manager. Managers traditionally were thought to represent
shareholders' interests and unions were thought to represent
workers'.

Of course, a viewpoint that equates managers' and

shareholders' interests is naive.4

Corporate scholars have long

3. Rights plans are one of the most powerful antitakeover defenses available to a target
company. See Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests:
When Is Using A Rights Plan Right?, 46 V AND. L. REv. 503, 505 (1993). Rights plans are
discussed extensively in RANDALL S. TuoMAs & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANow &
EINHORN ON PROXY CoNTESTS FOR CoRPORATE CONTROL § 20.02 (3d ed. Aspen L. & Bus.
1998) (footnotes omitted):
Almost one-half of America's major public companies have Rights Plans, or "poison
pills" as they are often called, and the remaining companies could put them in place
quickly if needed. These plans are expressly authorized by most states' corporate codes.
While a variety of different plans have been dubbed poison pills, the Share Purchase
Rights Plan {Rights Plan) is the most popular. Some of the co=on characteristics of
this type of Rights Plan are briefly described here.
Rights plans are usually created by a target company's board of directors without a
stockholder vote. The board must authorize the creation and distribution to its co=on
stockholders of a dividend of one right for each share of co=on stock they own. The
right entitles the stockholder to purchase co=on or preferred stock of the issuing
company or any potential acquiror. While initially the rights are transferable only with
the co=on stock and are not exercisable, once a "triggering event" occurs, new rights
certificates are distributed to the issuing company's stockholders and may be exercised.
The board of directors of the issuing company reserves the power to redeem the
rights for a certain period of time at a nominal price. This gives the board tremendous
negotiating leverage with the bidder: if the bidder agrees to the board's terms, the board
can stop the rights from becoming redeemable, avert the economic devastation that
would be inflicted on the bidder, and permit the bidder to acquire the company. If the
bidder does not agree to accept the board's demands, then the directors can use the
Rights Plan to stop the offer from proceeding.

Id.
A new and more potent version of the rights plan includes what are co=only referred to
as "dead hand" or "continuing director" provisions. These provisions permit only incumbent
directors or their designates to redeem or eliminate the rights plan. These provisions make it
impossible for an acquiror to take control of the company through a proxy contest and then
have the new board of directors remove the rights plan. In the few decided cases testing the
validity of these provisions, the courts have split over whether they should be upheld. Com
pare Bank of New York Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (invali
dating a continuing-director provision under New York law) with Invacare Corp. v.
Healthdyne Tech. Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997) {upholding a continuing director
provision under Georgia law); see also Shawn C. Lese, Note, Preventing Control from the
Grave: A Proposal for Judicial Treatment of Dead Hand Provisions in Poison Pills, 96
CoLUM. L. REv. 2175 {1996) (arguing that courts should invalidate these provisions).
4. A viewpoint equating union and worker interests is similarly naive, as the union
democracy literature has explored. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET ET AL., UNION
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emphasized a divergence between managers and shareholders.5
Indeed, in the 1980s workers often aligned with managers against
shareholders in thwarting hostile takeovers, depriving shareholders
of substantial premiums in the process.6 Most empirical work has
found that workers were not harmed by takeovers7 and so gained
little from this alignment. In the 1990s, a historic shift has begun, as
worker-shareholders prod other shareholders into holding
management more accountable. Important changes in corporate
governance have already resulted. To maintain its momentum, this
realignment will require unions to modify their self-image as well.
Unions, swept along by actions of their pension funds, increasingly

will focus on the long-run health of corporations. If they do not,
labor-shareholder activism may be a fad of the 1990s, doomed to
fizzle. But the potential exists for fundamental change in both
corporations and unions.
Much of what the union shareholder is doing is familiar to other
institutional shareholders - only the union sponsor is novel. For
example, in 1997 unions sponsored several resolutions to redeem
poison pills and to declassify corporate boards of directors classic issues of corporate governance - using Rule 14a-8,8 the
traditional avenue for shareholders to place resolutions on the
ballot at the annual meeting. Unions are also active in seeking
changes in executive pay, an area a bit closer to labor interests and
one in which institutional shareholder interest has been increasing
recently. For example, a Teamsters' pension fund sponsored a
shareholder resolution in General Electric's proxy statement for its
1997 annual meeting to cap executive base salaries at $1 million.9
DEMOCRACY (1956); Paul Jarley et al., A Structural Contingency Approach to Bureaucracy
and Democracy in U.S. National Uniofll, 40 ACAD. OF MGMr. J. 831, 832-34 (1997).

5. The classic work emphasizing the separation between shareholder ownership and
management control of corporations is ADoLF A. BERLE, JR. � GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1934).
6. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to Make
Shareholder Proposals, 73 WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 10-11, on file
with authors) ("During [the 1980s], unions generally supported corporate management in
resisting hostile acquisitions by, among other things, pushing for stronger state antitakeover
laws and accepting defensive employee stock ownership plans. Employee shareholders also
supported a host of other antitakeover devices that insulated management from the
consequences of poor performance. " (footnotes omitted)).
7. For an excellent summary of these studies, see Roberta Romano, A Guide to
Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 140-42 (1992)
(summarizing several studies and finding that "middle management . . . and not production
plant employees [are the ones] whose ranks are slimmed down after acquisitions ").
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1997).
9. See David Cay Johnston, Teamsters Are Challenging G.E. Chiefs Compensation, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1997, at D2. This proposal attracted nine percent of the votes cast at the
annual meeting, leading Teamsters' officials to conclude that feelings among investors against
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methods

unions

have

developed to get corporations to listen to traditional shareholder
complaints.

Unions are at the cutting edge of corporate and

securities law in getting their message out to other shareholders and
corporate boards of directors. One example of such innovation is
the Teamsters' widely publicized list of the "least valuable"
corporate directors.10 Press attacks on directors are an unusual
shareholder method of voicing displeasure, but the Teamsters'
substantive

complaint

shareholders:

with

the

directors

was

one

dear

to

the directors were not maximizing firm value. A

more important development is the number of labor-sponsored
"floor proposals" submitted for a shareholder vote at annual
meetings,

sometimes

independently

of the

company's

proxy

statement. The innovation with the greatest long-term potential to
alter the balance of power between shareholders and management
is mandatory amendment of corporate bylaws by shareholders.
Unions have been at the forefront in the recent movement by
shareholders to amend corporate bylaws to limit the authority of
boards of directors on the sensitive issue of takeover defenses.
Not all labor-shareholder activism involves a new-age alignment
of shareholder and worker interests. Sometimes unions use their
shareholder power simply as a new weapon to further unions'
traditional organizing and collective-bargaining goals. Some of the
shareholder activism certainly occurs at companies at which unions
are

concurrently

engaged in

contract negotiations

or union

organizing campaigns.11 Corporate management claims that most
union shareholder activity is part of a "corporate campaign"
designed

to

win

other

concessions

for

workers.

Corporate

management representatives have even asked the SEC to restrict

unions' ability to submit shareholder proposals.12 For example, the

high pay for executives is growing. See William M. Carley, GE Chairman Defends Pay,
Stresses Quality, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1997, at A4.
10. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Teamsters Hit a Nerve on Directors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1996, at Dl {discussing the Teamsters' pension fund list of the 23 least valuable directors and
its implications for corporate-governance reform).
11. See Frank Swoboda, AFL-CIO Changing Its Tactics: Union to Expand Advertising,
Corporate Campaigns Against Employers, WASH. PoST, Feb. 20, 1997, at C2 (reporting that
the AFL-CIO announced plans to increase stockholder campaigns against a range of
employers in the 1997 proxy season).
12. See Stephen Baker, The Yelping over Labor's New Tactics, Bus. WK., Oct. 23, 1995, at
75; see also Elizabeth Walpole-Hofmeister, Corporate Campaigns: Business Leaders Blast
Union Tactics; House Hearings Planned For November, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Sept. 22,
1995, at AA-1 (reporting that the American Trucking Association had sent a letter to the
SEC asking that it change its rules to permit companies to refuse to include union-sponsored
resolutions in proxy statements when they are submitted in the midst of a corporate
campaign).
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American Society of Corporate Secretaries and other management
groups have urged the SEC to impose limits on unions that are
using the shareholder-proxy process to increase their leverage at
the collective bargaining table.13 Management's arguments to
restrict labor unions' shareholder activism rest on the premise that
unions are seeking to protect jobs and further other labor interests
at the expense of the corporation and other shareholders.
We argue, however, that much of the union-shareholder
activism cannot be dismissed simply as an old dog's new tricks.

In

many cases, unions are trying to improve the financial performance
of their pension funds, just like any other institutional investor.
Between these two poles, we suspect that the goal behind some of
the union-shareholder activity is to become more involved in
strategic corporate decisions. In recent decades, unions have
become increasingly frustrated at their lack of influence over basic
corporate policy. Shareholder activism is a promising way of
getting the attention of top management and the board of directors.

In

this article, we investigate the consequences of the new

shareholder activism of unions.

We claim that much union

shareholder activity represents an alignment of shareholder and
worker interests that attempts to prod management to increase the
overall worth of the firm. At other times, the union shareholder
seeks to benefit workers at the expense of other shareholders. But
other shareholders are generally able to distinguish, on a case-by
case basis, which hat the union shareholder is wearing. Without the
support of other shareholders, the union shareholder cannot change
the company. These are not worker-owned firms. This check on
union-shareholder power - in addition to existing fiduciary checks
on union-pension-fund activism and powerful market forces negate the need for any change in corporate or securities law to
regulate union shareholders specifically. We therefore advocate no
change in existing law. We do argue, however, that the alignment
of union and other shareholders will have profound effects on both
corporate governance and long-term union goals.
We begin, in Part I, by describing two stories of union
shareholder activism that illustrate some of the issues involved.
Part

II

then

outlines

our

theoretical

framework.

Here

we

distinguish union-shareholder initiatives designed to further unions'
traditional organizing and collective bargaining goals from those
13. See SEC Meets with Corporate Secretaries, INSIGHTS, June 1996, at 33, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Insite File.
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that enhance unions' role as a participant in strategic corporate
decisionmaking, a newer vision of the union. We also distinguish

between activities of unions and their pension funds.

In

Part m, we use this framework to describe labor unions'

current voting initiatives. Our hypothesis is that it is no accident
that unions are at the cutting edge of innovative corporate law.

Their desire for a more visible presence in corporate boardrooms
requires innovation.

From the labor perspective, unions have

slowly withered as they focused on collective bargaining and relied

on strikes to back their demands. From the corporate perspective,

unions have remained peripheral players in the boardroom, despite

their vast stock holdings, because traditional shareholder voting
initiatives, particularly under Rule 14a-8, are largely ineffective

methods for focusing shareholders and directors on a limited

number

of

corporate-governance

issues.

Further,

but

more

tentatively, we suspect that unions are less able than other
institutional shareholders to exercise influence through informal,

behind-the-scenes discussions. Unions recognize the need for new

approaches - including approaches that do not reflexively regard
efficiency and profitability as goals of "enemy" shareholders, and

this has led them to become more creative in exploring new ways of

exercising their voices as shareholders.

Part IV evaluates how current legal and market forces regulate

union-shareholder activism. We conclude that existing legal and
market checks adequately constrain potential opportunistic union

behavior, so that legal reform is unnecessary. We identify three
forces that would check labor unions' efforts to act to further their

members' interests at the expense of other shareholders:

the

fiduciary structure of Taft-Hartley union pension funds; the need to

persuade other self-interested shareholders to vote for union

initiatives; and the disciplinary power of capital markets, the

market for corporate control, and product markets to constrain

corporate conduct that deviates too far from maximizing

shareholder profits. We conclude that these forces adequately limit
labor unions' ability to expropriate more corporate value for their
members, if they choose to pursue that course of action.

Finally, in Part V and the Conclusion, we examine several

different areas where unions have been active and look at how

these checks have affected their actions. We suggest that while

union-shareholder activism potentially could have long-lasting

effects on unions' role in corporate governance, it will be a passing
fad unless unions can garner other shareholders' support for their

Union-Shareholder Activism
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platform. To do so, unions need to focus their shareholder voting
initiatives in areas where they have special advantages in
monitoring management. If unions can package the results of their
research in proposals that emphasize to shareholders the ways in
which the two groups' interests are aligned, then union-shareholder
activism could be here to stay.
I.

Two STORIES OF UNION-SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM

As we examine union-shareholder activism, a key question is
whether unions use their rights as shareholders merely as a new
tactic for pursuing old goals, or whether they are forging a new role
for unions. Not surprisingly, we find that unions have both old and
new objectives in mind. We seek, however, to avoid simplistically
equating old union goals with harm to other shareholders, and new
union goals with furtherance of shareholder interests. Unions can
play either role, and either role can help or hinder other sharehold
ers. We begin our analysis and illustrate some of its complexity
with two stories of recent shareholder activity.
A.

The UFCW Floor Fights at Albertson's

Albertson's is a major chain of grocery stores, operating some

826 stores nationwide, concentrated in the western states. The
United Food and Commercial Workers

(UFCW)

has organized

many of the stores and represents about forty percent of Albert
son's retail employees.14 Albertson's more recently entered Ari
zona.

In

1989, it operated a single store in Yuma;15 as of January

1997, it had thirty-four stores in Arizona.16 By 1996,

UFCW Local

99R had organized the Yuma store and was negotiating a collective
contract there. More importantly, it was conducting a corporate
campaign to urge Albertson's to recognize the

UFCW

as the bar

gaining agent at some twenty-eight other stores in Arizona at which
the union had obtained authorization cards from employees.
UFCW is among the more successful unions at using the authoriza
tion card-corporate campaign approach to organizing as an alterna14. See Nationwide Class Action Suit Targets Albertson's Pay Practices, Mistreatment of
Workers, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 21, 1997, available in 1997 WL 5712189.
15. See Melanie Johnston, Supermarkets Feed Phoenix Glut, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 13,
1989, at 66.
16. See Albertson's Inc., 1997 SEC Form 10-K, at 5, available in EDGAR, Film No.
97,576,545. The EDGAR database is available on LEXIS, on Westlaw, and at the SEC's
homepage at <http://www.sec.gov/edgarhp.htm>.
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tive to traditional NLRB elections accompanied by recognitional
picketing.17
The national UFCW's corporate campaign against Albertson's
included backing a number of lawsuits alleging violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.18

In

addition, Local 99R bought forty-three

shares of stock in Albertson's and pursued its right as a shareholder
to introduce resolutions on the floor of the 1996 annual shareholder

meeting.19 Local 99R solicited the support of other Albertson's
shareholders for a proposal on confidential shareholder voting.20
The board of directors opposed the proposal. It emphasized that

the cost to the union of its proxy solicitation exceeded the value of
its forty-three shares, thus causing the board to believe that the
union did not submit its proposal "in the interests of the stockhold
ers," but rather to "pressure the Company to unionize its Arizona
employees."21 Nevertheless, the proposal received considerable
support of other shareholders, getting 21.4% of the vote.22

Local 99R increased the pressure on the Albertson's board by
carrying its shareholder campaign to other companies. Six Albert
son's board members were officers or directors of other companies

as well. Local 99R bought stock in these other companies and of

fered shareholder proposals at these other companies as well,23 on
such issues as voting on future golden parachutes, declassifying the
board, and redeeming the poison pill.24 The results of these share
holder proposals are presented in Table 3.
range from 0.1% to 44.6%.

The votes received

The effect of the union-shareholder activism at Albertson's is
unclear. The union did get votes on several of its proposals, but
none received majority shareholder support. Most of Albertson's
Arizona stores remain nonunion.25

In

the 1997 proxy season, the

17. See Laura M. Litvan, Can Unions Fit in New Economy?, INvEsToR's Bus. DAILY,
Apr. 7, 1997, at Al.
18. See Aaron Bernstein, This Union Suit Could Really Scratch, Bus. WK., Mar. 10, 1997,
at 37. The Fair Labor Standards Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994).
19. See Albertson's, Inc., Proxy Statement 29 (Apr. 25, 1996), available in EDGAR, F"tlm
No. 96,401,613.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 30.
22. See lNvEsroR REsPONSIBILITY REsEARCH Crn., SUMMARY oF 1996 U.S. SHAREHOLDER REsoLUTIONS 4 (1996) [hereinafter I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY].
23. See Albertson's, Inc., supra note 19, at 30.
24. See I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 4.
25. See, e.g., Food for Thought, SEA'ITLE TIMES, Feb. 24, 1997, at Dl, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Seattn File (describing Local 99R's campaign to organize Albertson's grocery
workers in Phoenix as unsuccessful).
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UFCW has again targeted Albertson's and companies with inter
locking directorates with corporate-governance proposals,26 so the
battle continues.
This story has several noteworthy points. The union's apparent
goal was to increase its organizing power, a traditional union goal.
The shareholder activity seemed to be a substitute for a strike. But
the proposals were targeted at corporate-governance reforms that
were not directly beneficial to narrow, worker-related union goals.
The union seemed to attempt to ally itself with shareholders, albeit
so far not completely successfully. The union introduced its propos
als on the floor of the annual meeting, rather than through the com
panies' proxy statements. The use of a floor fight was an innovative
technique under corporate law, which usually assumes that annual
shareholders' meetings simply rubber stamp management's
agenda.27 The UFCW appeared to use this approach to gain a more
visible presence in the Albertson's boardroom and to circumvent
obstacles to gaining its objectives through traditional labor tactics.
As such, these campaigns seem to reflect new union tactics in pur
suit of old union goals.
B.

Teamsters' Pension Fund Bylaw Proposals at Fleming
Companies, Inc.

Fleming Companies, Inc., is one of the nation's largest food dis
tributors. Its primary competitors include Kroger and Albertson's.
Approximately half of its "associates" are unionized by one of four
unions, including the Teamsters and the UFCW.28 On July 7, 1986,
the company implemented a poison pill with a ten-year life, imped
ing possible takeovers of the company.29 Both California Public
Employees Retirement System (Ca1PERS)30 and the Council for
26. See CoUNCIL OF lNsTL. !NvEsToRS LEITER, Mar. 14, 1997, at 2.
27. See Mike Dorning, Big Investors See Corporate Clout Growing, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 14,
1994, at Cl; see generally MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CoRPORATION
chs. 9-10 {1976).
28. See Fleming Cos., Inc., 1997 SEC Form 10-K, at 2, 8, 9, available in EDGAR, Fllm
No. 97,560,649.
29. See Fleming Cos., Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement 26-27 (Mar. 12, 1996), available in
EDGAR, Fllm No. 96,534,058. Tue original pill was strengthened on August 22, 1989. It was
due to expire July 6, 1996.
30. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, A Top-10 List Not Too Many Care To Be On, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1997, at DS.
·
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Institutional Investors (CII)31 have listed Fleming Companies on
their annual "worst companies" lists.

In 1996, the Teamsters' General Fund used Rule 14a-8 to pro

pose a shareholder resolution recommending that the company re

deem its current poison pill and have an affirmative shareholder

vote prior to adopting any future poison pill. The company in

cluded this proposal in its proxy materials.32 Despite management's
declared opposition to the proposal, sixty-four percent of the voting
shareholders voted to support it.33 Nevertheless, less than two
months later, Fleming's board of directors adopted a new poison
pill.34

In 1997, the Teamsters' General Fund proposed that the share

holders amend the company's bylaws to mandate that the board
redeem the poison pill and to forbid the board from enacting an

other without shareholder approval.35 After losing federal litiga

tion aimed at keeping the proposal off the ballot, the board
"voluntarily" terminated its current pill.36 Subsequently, 60.5% of

the shareholders voted for the renewed Teamsters' resolution.37

We flag several points of interest in this story. First, the union

action seemed closely intertwined with that of its pension funds.

The Teamsters' General Fund, sponsor of the shareholder propos
als, apparently owns only sixty-five shares of Fleming stock.38 Vari

ous Teamsters'

pension funds are important shareholders at

Fleming Companies, however, holding some 117,000 shares in
1996.39 Second, while many Fleming workers are members of the

Teamsters' Union, no special collective bargaining or organizing ac-

31. See John Authers, Investors' Council Renews Attack on U.S. Companies, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 8, 1996, at 31. The CII list compares company performance for up to the past
five years to share performance of other companies in the same industry.
32. See Fleming Cos., Inc., supra note 29, at 26-28.
33. See Fleming Cos., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 885, at *14
(Dec. 3, 1996).
34. See id.
35. See Ken Bertsch & Matt McGeary, Activists Keep Up the Heat in 1997; Attention
Focuses on Merger Activity, Poison Pills, CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL., Oct. 1996-Jan. 1997, at
1.
36. See Fleming Cos.: Board Decides to Terminate Company's Poison Pill Plan, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 19, 1997, at B4 [hereinafter Fleming Cos.].
37. See Fleming Shareholders Sack Defense, OMAHA WoRLD HERALD, May 1, 1997, at
22. The Teamsters' anti-poison-pill resolution passed at the company's shareholder meeting
held on April 30, 1997. See id.
38. See Fleming Cos., Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement 26 (Mar. 18, 1997), available in
EDGAR, Fiim No. 97,558,298.
39. See Fleming Shareholders Urge End to Poison Pill, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, May 2,
1996, at 26.
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tivity seemed to drive the shareholder proposals. The union goal
seemed to be to remove management's defenses to a takeover so
that its pension funds' stock could benefit. Third, the procedure
was novel. In the first attempt, the union tried a standard precatory
14a-8 proposal. Despite majority support from shareholders, the
incumbent board ignored the message from that traditional avenue.
The next year, the union turned to a highly innovative type of
shareholder activity- urging a mandatory change in corporate by
laws to restrict management's discretion to use a powerful antitak:e
over defense. These new tactics may be directed at a new goalmaximizing shareholder value.
In summary, the two stories show the difficulty of categorizing

union-shareholder activity. In the Fleming case, the union seemed

to act in a new role as catalyst of general shareholder interests. But
one suspects that the Teamsters picked on Fleming, out of the nu
merous companies the fund had invested in that have poison pills,
because of its hostile attitude towards the Teamsters.

Still, the

union succeeded in persuading other shareholders that its message
served their goal of maximizing

firm value.

In Albertson's, by con

trast, the union seemed to use shareholder pressure to further tradi
tional organizing and collective bargaining goals. Its actions at the
other companies, however, included an effort to redeem a poison
pill- the identical effort in the Fleming case.40 Apparently, other
shareholders remained suspicious of the union's effort, as its
poison-pill and other proposals did not receive majority share
holder support.
II.

SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND UNION GOALS AND MEANS

In this Part, we generalize the shareholder activism of unions
and their pension funds by placing it in a framework of ends and
means. We examine what is new and what is old about union
shareholder activism.
At the outset, we want to finesse two perennial questions about
union activities in order to concentrate on the specific issue of
union-shareholder activities. First, commentators often complain
that union leaders do not serve their members but instead aggran
dize their own positions. Just as difficulties in monitoring and other
agency problems create slack between corporate managers and
their shareholders, so too slack exists between union leaders and
40. See also Lublin, supra note 2 (noting that unions have sponsored resolutions to re
deem poison pills at 13 companies in 1997).

1030

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1018

their members.41 In an article that emphasizes divergences between
shareholders and managers, we do not want to assume naively that
union leaders represent their members perfectly, particularly in the
use of pension money. Certainly, unions have often been accused
of misusing their members' pension funds.42 It may turn out that
pension money spent on shareholder resolutions and associated liti
gation is not a good investment.43 Union members may be better
off with lower dues or lower pension costs than with the share
holder activism. On the other hand, spending union or pension
money to pursue rights aggressively as shareholders seems a trivial
problem compared to siphoning funds to Las Vegas casinos. Or, to
put the matter in corporate law language, union-shareholder activ
ity at most raises duty-of-care problems, not duty-of-loyalty
problems.
The second issue we wish to clarify and then finesse concerns
unions and overall shareholder profitability. Our thesis argues that
unions and their pension funds are aligning with other shareholders
to create more efficient governance structures for corporations.
The skeptic might wonder whether this lion-laying-with-lambs the
sis is plausible. The empirical evidence shows that, overall, unions
reduce profits that can be distributed to shareholders.44 This differs
·
from the claim that unions are inefficient, and considerable evi
dence suggests that unions enhance productivity, both by shocking
management into better practices and by helping to solve collec
tive-goods problems in the workplace.45 Thus, overall unions may
enlarge a corporation's pie but then grab an even larger slice.
These two faces of unionism were documented by the influential
41. See Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union
Contro� 1992 U. !LL. L. REv. 367 (comparing union member-leader relationship with corpo
rate shareholder-manager relationship).
42. See ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK, RoBusr UNIONISM 244-45, 248 (1991); Julius G. Getman,
Public Policy Implications of BRISA, 68 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 473, 475 (1994) (stating that "the
misuse of pension funds is one of the greatest areas of union corruption").
43. See infra text accompanying notes 157-70 (discussing the inconclusive evidence on
whether shareholder corporate-governance proposals improve firm performance).
44. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 181 (1984)
("Though exceptions can be found, unionization is more often than not associated with lower
profitability."); BARRY T. HmsCH & JoHN T. ADDISON, THE EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF UN·
IONS 211 (1986) ("[A]ll studies of which we are aware find unionism to be associated with
lower profits.").

45. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 44, at 169 ("[M]ost studies of productivity find
that unionized establishments are more productive than otherwise comparable nonunion es
tablishments."); HmsCH & ADDISON, supra note 44, at 215 ("The collective voice model has
rightly emphasized that unionism need not necessarily detract from productivity, and this is
an important finding in itself. What is in doubt is the generality and robustness of the unions
raise-productivity thesis.").
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labor economists Richard Freeman and James Medoff in their well
known book, What Do Unions Do?46
We avoid taking sides in a general debate over unions by focus
ing on a new and limited activity of unions and their pension funds
- that of shareholder activist. Even if unions traditionally reduce
shareholder profits, union-shareholder activism can enlarge the cor
porate pie without reducing the shareholding slice. As we discuss in
detail later, the limited available evidence suggests that union
shareholder activism may improve profitability for all shareholders.
Thus, other shareholders can applaud and follow union-shareholder
activism because it increases their own investment return, even if
they do not support the overall union agenda because it would
lower their return.
A.

Traditional Union Functions and Weapons

Traditional business unions have three basic functions and two
related weapons to help achieve their goals. First, unions organize
workers at nonunion firms. Second, once organized, unions bargain
with management. Third, once a collective bargaining agreement is
negotiated, unions monitor management to ensure that it complies
with the agreement, usually by processing worker complaints
through a grievance arbitration system. To achieve its goals, unions
strike and picket recalcitrant firms:
It is worth emphasizing that in the key area of collective bar
gaining, a union has two methods of obtaining the most favorable
contract for workers. First, of course, the union demands a bigger
slice of the pie, arguing that the employer should offer higher
wages, more benefits, and better working conditions. Second, how
ever, collective bargaining attempts to increase the size of the pie
by trading particular items to the highest-valued user. This is some
times called win win bargaining or value-added unionism.47 This
dual aspect of unionism will be a key feature of our analysis of the
union as shareholder.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was drafted with
traditional union functions and weapons in mind. First, the Act ac·

-

46. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 44; see also Richard B. Freeman & James L.
Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, PuB. !NrEREST, Fall 1979, at 69.
47. See Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening Up the
Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 827 (1996) (arguing that existing
labor law impedes newer forms of voice and various modes of communication between labor
and management by constraining the groups to have a primarily adversarial relationship, and
making suggestions as to how labor law should be changed to promote the voice aspect of
unionism).
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tively promotes the union functions of organization, collective bar
gaining, and grievance arbitration, while allowing workers free
choice in whether to be represented by a union.48 Second, labor
laws regulate the traditional economic weapons - the strike and
the picket sign - in a variety of ways.

A major regulatory principle

provides that the government should remain neutral in the eco
nomic battle between management and labor.49 The relative eco
nomic strength of union and management, rather than the views or
preferences of government officials, is supposed to determine the
outcome of collective bargaining. On the other hand, striking and

picketing are subject to detailed regulations.so In particular, the

secondary boycott provisions try to prevent unions from dragging
neutral employers into the fray.s1
In recent years, unions have become increasingly frustrated with
the NLRA and with their own declining importance in the Ameri
can economy and society. Traditional business unionism no longer
seems to work. The former president of the AFL-CIO even pub
licly called for a repeal of the NLRA,s2 and others emphasize its

uselessness.s3 In the face of a hostile Congress, however, labor law

reform is unlikely. Thus, unions must find ways to work within the
current framework and to avoid obstacles with new tactics. The
new president of the AFL-CIO, John Sweeney, has emphasized the
need for new thinking and new action by the labor movement.S4

B.

The Union Corporate Campaign

In the last twenty years or so, new union tactics have left labor
law regulation behind. Rather than relying solely on strikes and
picketing as the means of achieving their aims, unions increasingly
have resorted to a wide array of tactics. The umbrella term "union
corporate campaign" is now used to describe this broad range of
new tactics.
48. See

29 U.S.C. § 157 {1994).
49. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 232 (1990); Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Ar·
gument Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1662, 1675 {1983)).
50. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158{b){4), (7), 158{d), 163 {1994).
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4).
52. See Harry Bernstein, Creativity Needed to Stem Unions' Decline, L A. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1989, at pt IV, 1.
53. See Martin J. Morand, Canada: Our Model?, MoNTHLY REv., June 1990, at 40, 41-42.
54. See Aaron Bernstein, Sweeney's Blitz, Bus. WK., Feb. 17, 1997, at 56.
.
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The union corporate campaign was pioneered by Ray Rogers
when the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union

(ACTWU) attempted to organize J.P. Stevens in the late 1970s.55
Among the many tactics used, which included massive media pub

licity and consumer boycotts, ACTWU and sympathetic church
groups filed numerous shareholder proposals with J.P. Stevens.
None of those proposals received more than 9.1 % of the vote.5 6
Another tactic was to isolate Stevens's management by pressuring
its outside board members. During the campaign, three outside di
rectors resigned to avoid adverse publicity at their home compa
nies.57 The campaign succeeded in getting

J.P.

Stevens to bargain

with the union. As part of the settlement, ACTWU promised not
to engage in further corporate campaign tactics at the company. ss
At its broadest and blandest, the term union corporate campaign
means any union tactics, other than traditional strikes and picket
ing, used to pressure management to change some behavior.59 Usu
ally, the term implies a coordinated campaign using several tactics,
ranging from consumer boycotts and public-relations schemes to
proxy contests and disruption of the corporation's dealings with
creditors and lenders. 60
Management groups define union corporate campaigns in less

benign terms. In a 1995 press release, for example, the American
Trucking Association called on Congress to investigate corporate
55. See Judith Kenner Thompson, Union Use of Public Interest Proxy Resolutions,
STUD. J., Fall 1988, at 40, 46.

LAB.

56. See id. at 50 tbl.1. Most of the resolutions in the J.P. Stevens cases concerned the
ability of the corporation to remain profitable, given its disregard of labor law, affirmative
action policies, and safety and health regulations. See id. at 57.
57. See id. at 46.
58. See Stanley J. Brown & Alyse Bass, Corporate Campaigns: Employer Responses to
Labor's New Weapons, 6 LAB. LAW. 975, 988-89 (1990); Joel H. Siegal, Power in the Nineties:
An Analysis of the Management of Pension Funds for the Attainment of Union and Public
Interest Goals, 1987 DET. C.L. REv. 673, 681 (describing the terms of the settlement between
J.P. Stevens and ACTWU).
59. See Paul Jarley & Cheryl L. Maranto, Union Corporate Campaigns: An Assessment,
43 INnus. & LAB. REL. REv. 505, 506-07 (1990); Herbert R. Northrup, Union Corporate
Campaigns and Inside Games as a Strike Form, 19 EMPLOYEE REr.. LJ. 507, 507-13 (1994)
(emphasizing corporate campaigns as a substitute for traditional strikes). See generally
CHAru.Es R. PERRY, UNION CoRPORATE CAMPAIGNS (1987).
60. In a 1985 publication, the AFL-CIO listed 10 tactics that could be used in a corporate
campaign: (1) building coalitions with other labor and non-labor groups; (2) public relations
activities; (3) legislative initiatives; (4) appeals to regulatory agencies; (5) legal actions; (6)
consumer actions; (7) pressuring lenders and creditors; (8) threats to withdraw pension fund
assets; (9) stockholder actions; and (10) in-plant actions. See INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPT.,
AFL-CIO, DEVELOPING NE W TACTICS: WINNING WlTii CoORDINATED CoRPORATE CAM
PAIGNS 4-10 (1985).
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campaign tactics, declaring that such campaigns' purpose was to
damage the company:
The purpose of a union corporate campaign is to damage a company's
business, trade and reputation in order to pressure the company into
concessions during a labor dispute or organizing drive. Such cam
paigns typically include carefully orchestrated tactics such as suspi
ciously-timed complaints to government agencies, consumer boycotts,
shareholder resolutions, and harassment of company officers, direc
tors and customers.61

The Association proposed, among other things, that the SEC refuse
to include any union-sponsored shareholder resolutions in annual
proxy statements if an organizing campaign or collective bargaining
was imminent.62
The wide variety of goals and tactics used makes it difficult to
characterize corporate campaigns. Often, a corporate campaign
uses new tactics to pursue the traditional goals of organizing or col
lective bargaining. The new tactics are simply a complement or
substitute for the traditional tactics of striking and picketing.63 In
these situations, unions engaged in a corporate campaign often self
consciously use warlike rhetoric, with management as the enemy.64
In other cases, the goals in a corporate campaign seem new.
Some scholars believe that the union corporate campaign has arisen
as unions try to influence strategic business decisions of top man
agement.65 Unions may also use various corporate-campaign tac
tics, however, in an effort to encourage management to listen to the
union. Corporate-governance issues are not mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining,66 so management listens to unions' opinions
or statements on these subjects only voluntarily. When viewed in
this light, some union-shareholder proposals may appear to be an
61. See Business Leaders Attack Union "Corporate Campaign" Tactics; Call for Congres·
sional Inquiry, AMERICAN TRUCKING AssocIATIONS NEWS RELEASE (American 'Ilucking
Assns., Alexandria, Va.), Sept. 21, 1995.
62. See id. For a defense against charges that corporate campaigns constitute disloyalty
for NLRA purposes, see Melinda J. Branscomb, Labor, Loyalty, and tlze Corporate Cam
paign, 73 B.U. L. REv. 291 (1993).
63. Jarley and Maranto use this approach, organizing corporate campaigns into three
types: organizing, strike complement, and strike substitute. See Jarley & Maranto, supra
note 59, at 507-10.
64. See Northrup, supra note 59, at 519 ("Union literature is couched in emotionally
charged rhetoric and fighting or warlike terminology both in corporate campaign and in in
side game activities in order to create and to maintain an atmosphere of conflict.").
65. See THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 195-97 (1994).
66. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 344 n.1 (1958) (defin·
ing the scope of mandatory subjects, including "'rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment"' (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994))).
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attempt to work within the constraints of securities law, and to
avoid the limits of labor law, to gain management's ear on a wider
range of topics. Management's willingness to listen will depend in
part on whether other shareholders support the union. In this situa
tion, unions are more likely to emphasize cooperative strategies.
C.

Union-Shareholder Activity - New Tactics or New Role?

Union-shareholder activity sometimes serves old union goals.
Often shareholder activity is part of a corporate campaign, used
along with other tactics, to strengthen a union's collective-bargain
ing position. Generally, one might think such shareholder activism
comes at the expense of other shareholders. Shareholder resolu
tions to pressure boards of directors to take union-favorable stances
in collective bargaining may be an example. But, as we observed
earlier,67 unions do, in the course of collective bargaining, attempt
to enlarge the overall pie as a means of getting a larger slice for
workers. Using shareholder tactics can have pie-enlarging effects as
well, even when the ultimate goal is to improve the workers' lot
through collective bargaining. Attacks on poison pills68 or exces
sive executive salaries in the midst of collective bargaining might fit
in this category.
In other cases, unions seem to be using their shareholder power
to forge a new role for themselves - becoming important players
in the structure and strategic decisionmaking of the firm. In this
new role, unions can further shareholders' interests as well as work
ers' interests. For example, unions can help corporations make effi
cient tradeoffs by representing workers' voices in collective
decisions.69 But unions, in their new strategic mode, could decrease
overall

firm

value by needlessly delaying painful decisions.

In

short, there is no one-to-one relation between union goals and
shareholder interests.
Still, to be successful, union-shareholder activism must gain the
support of other shareholders. This is most likely to occur when
unions embrace a goal of maximizing

firm

value - clearly a new

way of thinking for some unions. Other shareholders are naturally
suspicious of unions' motives, and union-shareholder activism will
67. See supra section II.A.
68. See John M. Bizjak & Christopher J. Marquette, Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark
and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills (Jan. 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (observing that shareholder activism through
poison-pill-recession proposals can be an effective form of managerial oversight and corpo
rate governance).
69. See generally FREEMAN & MEooFF, supra note 44.
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remain quixotic unless the proposals plainly attempt to maximize
overall :firm value, rather than promote narrow union interests.1°

An alignment of union and shareholder interests sounds unreal
istic at first blush. The last foray of unions into corporate-govern
ance issues occurred in the 1980s, . when unions were active
supporters of state legislation to thwart takeovers.71 Management
of large corporations also favored such statutes. The standard cor
porate law view of such legislation is that it protects managers of
large corporations and harms shareholders,72 who are prevented
from receiving the benefit of higher share prices that result when
corporate ownership is traded to higher-value users.

In retrospect,

takeover activity generally did not harm rank-and-file workers, and
the alignment of unions with management against shareholders may

be seen by unions today as a mistake. In the shareholder activism
of the 1990s, unions have changed their alignment, creating infor
mal coalitions with shareholders against management on certain
issues.
Why have unions shifted toward a position of maximizing share
holder value? We suggest that there are at least four reasons why
labor unions want to take a lead role in improving corporate
governance structures. First, union members have significant :firm.
specific human-capital investments in the firms where they work
and thus are residual claimants of these :firms.73 Second, unions
have special monitoring abilities and can create value for other
shareholders through their policing of the agency costs of equity.
Third, unions are outsiders to the traditional corporate-governance
system and do not suffer many of the conflicts of interest that side
line or severely hamper other shareholders' activism. Finally, and
more tentatively, if labor union membership is aging, it would be
appropriate for unions to focus more of their efforts on improving
70. This conclusion corresponds with the findings of Judith Kenner Thompson's study of
union proxy resolutions during 1975-1978. See Thompson, supra note 55. Although the reso
lutions were uniformly unsuccessful, Thompson notes that resolutions specifically worded to
elicit shareholder support for a labor dispute received very low levels of support, while reso
lutions worded to address concerns shared by all shareholders received relatively higher rates
of support. See id. at 56-57.
71. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
72. See ROBERTA RoMANo, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 57-59 (1993)
(noting that antitakeover statutes politically were supported by and served managers of large
corporations); see also Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis ofthe Various Rationales

for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STET
SON L. REv. 23, 31-36 (1991) (noting that managers also supported nonshareholder-constitu
ency statutes).
73. See Bernard Black, Corporate Law and Residual Claimants (Dec. 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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the value of the retirement component of worker compensation and
therefore to engage in shareholder activism as a means of raising
the value of pension assets held by workers.
Unions have a greater incentive than most shareholders to mon
itor management rather than free ride on monitoring by others.
Workers are locked into the firm with firm-specific human-capital
investments, while shareholders have diversified portfolios with rel
atively little fixed interest in a single firm. Workers thus have
greater incentives to monitor management to ensure that the firm
remains healthy. If unions could harness this incentive and ability
to monitor and credibly relay their information to other sharehold
ers, or to the independent directors on the board, a major role for
unions could develop.74 In short, if workers want to protect their
residual claims on these firms, they have significant incentives to
become activist shareholders and to reform inefficient corporate
governance systems.
Unions have the capability and incentive to play a beneficial
monitoring role for shareholders. This capability arises from their
unique access to information, which comes from their day-to-day
involvement with the corporation. Unions, in representing work
ers, regularly assemble and analyze information about the firm
from a variety of internal and external sources.75 Unions routinely
collect and evaluate general information regarding corporate per
formance, industry trends and forecasts, as well as information that
is specific to contractual provisions. Many national and interna
tional unions maintain research departments for this purpose. In
addition, most unions have on staff a number of professionals, in
cluding economists, lawyers, accountants, and human resources spe
cialists, to assist them in their work.76
The informational expertise of unions may be most useful in
scrutinizing executive-compensation decisions. Increasing competi74. One example of this is the UFCW's successful "information relay" portion of its cor
porate campaigns. The UFCW collects information from employees regarding employers'
legal infractions and then "forwards" that information to news reporters, lawyers, or the
appropriate regulatory authorities. See Bernstein, supra note 18, at 37. Recently, the UFCW
has begun employing its own lawyers to pursue these claims. See id. Successful union moni
toring of this type, conducted on behalf of shareholders, could eliminate or greatly reduce
many types of corporate fraud.
75. Because unions collect information regarding employee preferences as part of these
activities, their information-collection and communication activities may actually enhance
productivity levels within the firm. For example, unions may communicate the "optimal" mix
of compensation for employees, and thereby reduce turnover. See FREEMAN & MEooFF,
supra note 44, at 15.
76. See Paul F. Clark & Lois S. Gray, Union Administration, in THE STATE OF THE
UNIONS 175, 184 (George Strauss et al. eds., 1991).
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tion, and the resultant emphasis on cost-cutting and increasing pro
ductivity, has forced unions to become well versed in the myriad
compensation mechanisms that directly tie worker productivity to
corporate performance, as well as those that can be used to cut la
bor costs. As a result, unions negotiate over the establishment of
compensation systems for their workers that have some of the same
features - for example, stock plans, bonuses, profit-sharing mecha
nisms, and deferred compensation - as executive-compensation
plans.
Unions also have access to information regarding the day-to-day
activities of firms. To the extent that day-to-day operations reflect
corporate policies and strategies defined by directors and officers,
unions have information regarding the effect of those strategies "on
the floor." Moreover, unions' presence in the firm gives them an
opportunity not available to most shareholders to assess the extent
to which compensation systems reward supervisors, managers, and
officers for short-term, as opposed to long-term, improvements in
productivity and decreases in operating costs. Unions often know
when morale is good or whether a flashy new project is a
boondoggle.
Even in cases where unions do not have unique access to infor
mation, they can help other shareholders by their willingness to
challenge management. Union shareholders are rarely part of in
terlocking directorates and more generally are outside the usual
"old boy" network of corporate investing that can impede corpo
rate pension funds or financial institutions from opposing manage
ment. With less social capital at risk, unions can be the point of
attack in ways that outside directors and certain other institutional
investors cannot when the top management of a particular corpora
tion becomes self-serving.77 For example, outside directors who are
CEOs of another corporation may be unwilling to raise serious
questions about executive compensation for fear of having the spot
light turned on their own pay one day. Other institutional share
holders may have conflicts of interest that stop them from raising
important corporate-governance issues.78 But once a union share77. For a description and critique of this view, see Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund
Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 CoLuM. L. REv. 795, 796 & n.3 (1993)
("[M]anagers of corporate pension funds and financial institutions have other business rela
tions with issuers that are thought to generate conflicts of interest preventing them from
opposing corporate management.").
78. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise ofInstitutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811, 826-27 (1992) (describing the various conflicts of interest that
arise amongst institutional investors in opposing management actions); see also Sweeney,
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holder raises the issue, other institutional investors may concur and
outside directors may be compelled to act in the overall interest of
shareholders.
On the other hand, other shareholders may suspect that unions
are willing to sacrifice their shareholder stake for their worker in
terests. Just as public pension funds face distinctive conflicts that
limit the effectiveness of their shareholder activism,79 so do unions
and union pension funds.

Even standard corporate-governance

proposals issued by a union are given extra scrutiny by corporate
management.80 Some observers have detected, however, greater
willingness recently by other institutional shareholders to take
union-shareholder proposals at face value.81
Finally, we tentatively suggest that increasing levels of union
shareholder activism may be due in part to a shift in the age compo
sition of the unions. If the age distribution of labor unions is getting
older, as statistical evidence suggests it is,82 unions likely will place

increased emphasis on retirement conditions, employer contribu

tions, and other pension-related matters. Unions face strategic
choices as to how best to provide these benefits for their constitu
ents. One option is to rely on traditional bargaining approaches to
secure improvements in those benefits. Another is to supplement
these approaches with shareholder activism, given its potential for
improving shareholder value both through the adoption of share
holder proposals and through negotiation with corporate boards.83
supra note 2, at 25 ("[U]nions are barging into places where other institutional shareholders
have been treading softly.").

79. Roberta Romano has emphasized the conflicts that public pension funds have in
monitoring management See Romano, supra note 77.
80. "When [unions] voice opposition to poison pills, classified boards, cumulative voting,
and, increasingly, pay-for-performance of top executives . . . 'companies are looking under
the four comers of [union] documents trying to interpret labor's true agenda.'" Sweeney,
supra note 2, at 21 (quoting John Richardson, Deputy Director of Research for the Laborers'
International Union of North America); see also id. at 23 (discussing Investor Responsibility
Research Center attorney Patrick McGum's claim that because the labor pension funds fre
quently have a "bifurcated agenda," they are often treated with more distrust than other
shareholders).
81. Jon Lukomnik, City of New York deputy comptroller for pensions and overseer of
some $60 billion in city employees' funds, was quoted as saying: "If [Taft-Hartley fund] pro
posals meet our written guidelines, we do not look at the sponsorship. We deal with the
substance of the resolutions." Id. at 25.
82. Older workers are more likely to be union members than younger workers. See
Union Members: Who They Are, Where They Work, and What They Earn, MONTHLY LAB.
REv., May 1996, at 42. For an analysis of conflicting empirical studies of age as a determinate
of unionism, see HmsCH & AnmsoN, supra note 44, at 58-59.

83. The potential for differences in opinion as to the appropriate strategy was revealed in
the recent election for Teamsters' president. James P. Hoffa emphasized negotiation over
specific early retirement provisions and a maintenance of shareholder activism, while Ron
Carey advocated increased attention to corporate-governance activities and adoption of a
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This possible motive seems especially powerful given the recent
shift away from defined-benefit plans towards defined-contribution
plans. 84 As a result, even though many union plans are still of the
defined-benefit type, fund performance, in addition to the ability of
their unions to negotiate greater employer-contribution levels and
other retirement provisions, now increasingly influences members'
benefits. This will add to unions' incentives to improve corporate
governance systems and to increase shareholder value.
Even if unions ultimately are unable to form a complete alliance
with institutional investors, union-shareholder activism may serve
the long-term interests of unions. For many years, unions have be
come increasingly irrelevant to major corporate decisions. They are
simply ignored. Shareholder activism is one way to get the atten
tion of the board of directors. Even if individual union-shareholder
proposals do not receive a majority of shareholders' votes or em
barrass management into changing its ways - and most do not these proposals do attract attention. Boards of directors will be
come aware again of unions, which could be in the long-run interest
of unions.
A key question in union-shareholder activism is whether and
how the strategies of unions and their pension funds can and should
be linked.85 Public pension funds are among the fastest-growing
equity holders in this country.86 Workers are becoming capitalists.
number of pension-fund-related reforms. See Christine Williamson, Pension Key in Team·
sters Election, PENSIONS & lNvEsrMENTS, Nov. 11, 1996, at 3. Differences in strategies among
unions, particularly in the area of corporate governance, were revealed when the United
Auto Workers, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and the
United Steelworkers of America began discussing their proposed merger. See Barry B. Burr,
Union of Pension Issues?: Merging Labor Groups Differ on Corporate Governance, PEN·
SIONS & lNvEsrMENTS, Aug. 7, 1995, at 3.

84. In 1977, union members' pension programs were more likely to be defined-benefit
plans, in which a pension level is specified and payments by the company are geared toward
maintaining this level. See FREEMAN & MEooFF, supra note 44, at 68. Of union private
pension plans, 89% were of the defined benefit type, compared to 35% of nonunion plans.
See id. Since that time, there has been a marked shift toward defined contribution plans.
See, e.g., William E. Even & David A. MacPherson, Why Did Male Pension Coverage Decline
in the 1980s?, 41 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 439, 441-42 (1994); Alan L. Gustman et al., The
Role of Pensions in the Labor Market: A Survey of the Literature, 41 !Nous. & LAB. REL.
REv. 417, 435 (1994). These plans specify the company's payments, while the investment
success of the fund determines the benefits. Defined-contribution plans also increasingly are
used as a supplement to defined-benefit plans. See id. at 435. For example, in 1996 the
Teamsters' Union, which oversees 170 defined-benefit pension plans, began a national 401(k)
plan as a supplemental savings plan. In order to obtain coverage, Teamsters' members' em
ployers will have to agree in contract negotiations to include the 401(k) as a benefit. See
Christine Williamson, Teamsters Start National 401 (k) Plan; 1 Million Workers to Be Eligible,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Apr. 29, 1996, at 1.
85. In our discussion, we will distinguish the actions of unions and their pension funds
whenever possible, although it is not always possible for us to peek behind the scenes.
86.

See Black, supra note 78, at 827.
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Many observers have speculated for years about the potential
power of pension funds to further worker goals.s7

Professor

William Simon, however, is skeptical of the ability of pension funds
to help corporate campaigns with traditional goals of organizing or
bargaining with a particular employer.ss Simon notes that the pen
sion funds are diversified, and he concludes that their power could
be brought to bear on a particular firm only if coordinated by labor
federations with strong central contro1.s9 Such federations do not
exist in the United States.9o
Professor Simon suggests a "more modest" role for pension
funds - to develop a coordinating institution that could research
companies, recommend votes on contested shareholder voting is
sues, and field candidates for boards.91 Simon's proposal for insti
tutional investors resembles that made by Professors Gilson and
Kraakman,92 and put into practice by companies such as Institu
tional Shareholder Services. Simon calls this role "more modest"
because it would have little direct effect on organizing or collective
bargaining at individual companies.93 But this role is indeed vision
ary and powerful if it would cause corporate boards to notice union
goals and values - even if stated at a vague level of generality.
In the next section, we analyze in some detail the new methods
that unions are using to bring their message to fellow shareholders
or the board of directors. Unions, rather than other shareholders,
have been at the forefront of these innovations. · we suggest
throughout that it is no accident that unions are being creative here.
Unions' necessity may be the mother of invention. Institutional in
vestors increasingly are using informal means to communicate with
management.94 Companies suspicious of unions' motives may not
87. See RlFKIN & BARBER, supra note 1.
88. See William H. Simon, The Prospects of Pension Fund Socialism, 14 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 270 (1993).
89. See id.
90. See id.
9 1. See id.
92. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1991).
93. See Simon, supra note 88, at 270.
94. Some institutional investors, particularly large pension funds, are using the proxy pro·

cess as a "bargaining chip" in their efforts to negotiate with management over issues related
to firm performance or corporate governance. For example, in the 1995 proxy season,
CalPERS, New York City Employee's Retirement System (NYCERS), the New York City
Teachers' Retirement Systems, and the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) delayed
announcement of the firms they had targeted for activism until after they held talks with top
management. See Alan L. Dye & Gregory W. Hair, Preparing for the Annual Meeting and
Shareholder Activism, in POSTGRADUATE CoURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAw 349, 385
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be as willing, however, to negotiate informally with unions regard
ing corporate-governance issues.95 If unions are excluded from this
informal network, they may find it necessary to rely on more formal
mechanisms, such as shareholder resolutions, in order for the
boards of directors to hear unions' "shareholder voice."

ill.

LABOR'S SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND CORPORATE LAW

Labor groups have launched an unprecedented variety of voting
initiatives at companies across the nation in the past few years. In
this Part, we discuss the different methods that labor is using in
these initiatives and the legal issues they raise. We aim to convince
the corporate specialist that these union initiatives are sophisti
cated, important, and new. Our overall message is that these union
led techniques should not be viewed as ploys to enhance labor's
share of the corporate pie, but rather as techniques that generally
increase incentives of management to improve firm efficiency.
We begin by discussing labor-shareholder proposals made pur
suant to Rule 14a-8. These proposals take two forms: traditional
corporate-governance proposals, discussed in section III.A, and the
more powerful, binding bylaw amendments, which are the topic of
(ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials No. SB-09, 1996). The groups submitted proposals if
the company did not provide a satisfactory response or if negotiations failed. See id.
95. In general, larger, established pension funds may be more successful than unions in
getting companies to negotiate over their concerns. See id. at 385. The size of funds such as
CalPERS may provide them with an ability to trigger negotiations without first submitting
proposals. Some have noted that the decline in activism by large pension funds during the
1996 season was in part due to their interest in - and ability to use - direct negotiations.
See John C. Wilcox, An Investor Relations Perspective on the SEC Communications Rules, in
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND CoMPENSATION RULES ch. 14 (2d ed. 1997), re
printed in FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MERGERS AND AcQUismoNs: A NE W ERA 571, 577
(PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-973, 1997). Getting management to
discuss key issues with investors other than established, large pension funds may require
them first to submit a proposal. See Vmeeta Anand, Funds Flexing Muscles Early in Proxy
Battles, PENSIONS & !NvEsTMENTS, Mar. 17, 1997, at 20 ("But without filing these proposals
in the first place, investors find it hard to get attention." (quoting Douglas G. Cogan, Investor
Responsibility Research Ctr.)).
Unlike many other investors, labor groups also face a significant amount of skepticism
and suspicion when submitting proposals. Management initially reacted to increased union
shareholder activism by labeling the proposals submitted as "not real" proposals, but instead
part of a campaign to force management to concede on issues related to collective bargain
ing. See Michael W. Goroff, Recent Developments in Proxy Contests, in DoINo DEALS 1995,
at 347, 372-73 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-711, 1995). Although
today more companies appear willing to discuss issues raised by labor groups - as suggested
by the number of proposals withdrawn after negotiations in the 1997 season - some still
allege that unions submitting proposals have a "hidden agenda." See, e.g., Lublin, supra note
2 (describing the current battle between May Department Stores and the Union of Needle
trades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE), in which the company alleges that
UNITE submitted its poison pill measure - a proposal to amend the bylaws - solely to
advance the union's own agenda).
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looks at labor's submission of share

holder resolutions directly at the annual shareholders' meeting so-called "floor resolutions." Unions have sought support for these
proposals either through the use of the company's proxy materials
or by conducting an independent solicitation of proxies. Section

ID.C examines some of the recent campaigns and the legal issues
that they raise under the federal proxy rules. Finally, section ID.D
briefly discusses recent "Just Vote No" campaigns, in which unions
and other shareholders selectively have withheld their approval for
slates from candidates for a company's board of directors in order
to register their disapproval of certain board actions.
Floor resolutions and binding bylaw amendments have the po
tential to bring about mandatory corporate action and inject unions
directly into the boardroom. By contrast, traditional corporate
govemance proposals and "Just Vote No" campaigns rely on indi
rect pressure on corporate boards to further union-shareholder
objectives. A union's choice among these tactics will depend on
what it perceives it needs to do to get a board's attention.
A.

Union Use of the Shareholder Proposal Rule - Rule 14a-8

Shareholders of public companies have the ability, subject to
certain limitations and restrictions, to put proposals on the com
pany's ballot at its annual meeting through the use of SEC Rule
14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule.96 If a security holder of a cor
poration notifies the company of its intention to present a proposal
for action at a forthcoming shareholders' meeting, the company
must include the proposal in its own proxy material and provide a
means by which the security holders can vote with respect to the
proposal. The issuer can exclude a proposal, however, if the propo
nent fails to meet certain procedural eligibility requirements97 or
substantive content restrictions.98
Until recently, shareholders did not use Rule 14a-8 to attempt
to influence the management of public companies. During the first
96. See General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8 (1997). For a more complete description of Rule 14a-8, see THOMAS & DIXON,
supra note 3, § 16.
97. Rule 14a-8(a) establishes four threshold eligibility requirements: (1) ownership of
shares; (2) notice and attendance at meeting; (3) timeliness; and (4) number of proposals.
See 11 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a). These are discussed in more detail in Thomas & Martin, supra
note 6 (manuscript at 19 n.34).
98. Rule 14a-8(c)(l)-(13) set forth 13 circumstances under which companies may omit
proposals from their proxy materials. See 17 C.F .R. § 240.14a-8(c). 1\vo of these provisions,
14a-8(c)(4) and 14a-8(c)(7), are discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 132-52.
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thirty years of its existence, the rule was used primarily by small,
individual shareholders to obtain a forum for expression of opin
ions that attracted little support from the rest of the shareholder
body. These activists invoked the rule to obtain a forum for chal
lenging management's conduct of internal corporate govemance.99
Pioneering "gadflies," such as Lewis Gilbert, offered resolutions on
such financial or operational matters as dividend policy, selection of
auditors, and officer and director compensation, as well as broader
governance issues such as the location of the annual meeting, cumu

lative voting, and director qualifications.100

Beginning with Ralph Nader's legendary "Campaign GM" in
the early 1970s, however, the focus of shareholder activism shifted
to the role and responsibilities of the corporation in modem soci
ety.101 Social-responsibility proposals, attacking a variety of per
ceived corporate evils, became increasingly numerous in the 1970s
and 1980s, although they rarely received substantial support.
By the 1980s, investors began using the shareholder proposal
process as a means of challenging corporate antitakeover initia
tives.102 In the 1990s, this trend has continued and was reinforced
by the 1992 amendments to the federal proxy rules that gave share
holders enhanced latitude to communicate amongst themselves.103
Institutions have successfully employed Rule 14a-8 to persuade
companies to effect changes in board structure and function, execu99. See Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate
Democracy, 23 GA. L. REv. 97, 116-17 (1988); see also Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to
Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REv. 425, 428-30 (1984) (discussing the
early usage of the shareholder proposal rule).
100. See Jill E. FISch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46
VAND. L. REv. 1129, 1146 (1993); Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A
Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REv. 879, 879-80 (1994); Ryan, supra note
99, at 116-17; see also Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, The SEC Proxy Proposal
Rule: The Corporate Gadfly, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 807, 813-30 (1952) (discussing a study of
proxy solicitations from 1948-1951, in which the authors found that shareholder proposals
generally addressed cumulative voting, auditor selection, annual meeting location, and post
meeting reports).

101. See Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Cam
paign GM, 69 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1971); Donald E. Schwartz & Elliot J. Weiss, An Assess
ment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEo. LJ. 635 (1977); see also Medical
Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 680-82 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (construing the
ordinary business exclusion to permit shareholders to make a proposal that would alter the
nature of the company's business, and ordering Dow Chemical Company to include in its
proxy materials a shareholder proposal seeking to stop the company's continued production
of napalm despite the SEC's earlier issuance of a no-action letter), vacated as moot, 404 U.S.
403 (1972).

102. See Palmiter, supra note 100, at 883-84; Ryan, supra note 99, at 157-59.
103. For an extensive discussion of the 1992 proxy rule amendments, see THOMAS &
DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.0l(F).
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tive and director compensation, and other governance-related
matters.
Labor unions began using Rule 14a-8 heavily in the 1990s to
make corporate-governance proposals.104 In the 1994 proxy season,
labor interests collectively used Rule 14a-8 to file a larger number
of corporate-governance proposals (eighty) and won more majority
votes (seven) on these proposals than any other investor group.105
For the 1995 proxy season, labor organizations filed almost as many
proposals as the year before.106 A group of fourteen unions, union
pension funds, individual union memb�rs and a labor-oriented in
vestment fund filed seventy-five out of the 265 shareholder propos
als on corporate-governance issues that were tracked by the
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), an independent
shareholder organization.107 Labor organizations have continued
to be very active in submitting shareholder proposals, although the
number of proposals submitted in 1996 was slightly below their
peak participation levels in 1994.108 Tables 1 and 2 summarize data
on union shareholder proposals in 1996 and 1997, respectively.
The amazing thing about these union-sponsored shareholder
proposals is how ordinary they are, from the perspective of any in
stitutional investor. They involve standard corporate-governance
issues designed to maximize the value of the corporation by im
proving the efficiency of the market for corporate control and align
ing manager incentives with shareholder interests. The most
frequent proposals in the 1995 and 1996 proxy seasons were those
to redeem or vote on poison pills and to repeal classified boards.
Of the fifty-four labor-submitted proposals identified by IRRC for
104. For an in-depth discussion of the development of union-shareholder activism, see
Thomas & Martin, supra note 6 (manuscript at 10-18).
105. See Patrick S. McGum, Labor, IRAA Spark Active 1995 Shareholder Campaign,

CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 1, 3 [hereinafter McGum, Shareholder

Cam
paign]; see also Bernstein, supra note 2, at 79 (observing that unions accounted for 70 proxy
battles and 7 of the 11 victories registered by shareholders during 1994); Patrick S. McGum,
Controversy Swirls A round Labor Unions' Shareholder Activism, CoRP. GOVERNANCE
BULL., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 3 [hereinafter McGum, Controversy] (discussing proposals filed
before actual votes taken). Several labor proposals to redeem a company's poison pill re
ceived more than 50% of the votes counted. See id.
106. See McGum, Shareholder Campaign, supra note 105, at 1.
107. See Checklist of 1995 Shareholder Proposals, CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL., Apr.-June
1995, at 21-31.
108. Labor groups include unions, union pension funds, and labor-oriented investment
funds - for example, Amalgamated Bank of New York LongView Collective Investment
Fund. For further discussion of labor activism in the 1994 proxy season, see Thomas &
Martin, supra note 6. See also infra app. tbls.1&2.
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ten relate to poison pills and fourteen deal

with declassifying the board.109
Labor organizations submitted a wide variety of other corpo
rate-governance proposals in the

1997 proxy season.

Proposals on

board-related issues include adding an employee to the board,11°
limiting relatives on the board,111 and prohibiting director conflicts
of interest.112 Proposals for cumulative voting and for confidential
voting are still being submitted, but in smaller numbers.113 Execu
tive pay and performance proposals seem to be appearing more fre
quently in

1997 than in years past.114

Companies are apparently being more accommodating to
union-shareholder proposals in the last couple of years. The

1996

proxy season saw a decline in the number of no-action requests by
companies.115 IRRC reports indicate that thirteen companies re
quested no-action letters for fourteen labor-submitted proposals.116
Five of these were granted, primarily on the basis of the proposals
being rendered moot under Rule 14a-8(c)(10).117 Similar IRRC
data for January 1997 show thirteen companies challenging fifteen
proposals.118 So far, the SEC has not concurred with companies'
arguments that it should exclude proposals on the ground that they
109. See Checklist of1997 Shareholder Proposals, CoRP. GOVERNANCE Buu , Oct. 1996·
Jan. 1997, at 25-32.
•
.

110. See id. at 25.
111. See id. at 31.
112. See, e.g., Robert W. Newbury, Individuals Again Lead Pack on Shareholder Resolu
tions, CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL., Oct. 1996-Jan. 1997, at 6 (observing that the Operating

Engineers submitted a proposal in 1996, and again in 1997, to prohibit directors from receiv
ing consulting fees while sitting on the board of WMX Technologies).
113. For example, there were nine proposals regarding confidential voting by June 1995,
three such proposals by June 1996, and only one proposal by January 1997. See sources cited
infra note 114.

114. Issues appearing with greater frequency include separating the chair and CEO posi·
tion (one in 1995 and four by early 1997) and imposing various limitations on executive pay
- for example, limiting deferred compensation, linking pay to overseas labor standards, lim·
iting CEO pay increases to the percentage granted workers, and limiting the ability of a CEO
to cash in options within six months of a major layoff. See Checklist of 1997 Shareholder
Proposals, supra note 109, at 25-32; Checklist of1996 Shareholder Proposals, CoRP. GOVERN·
ANCE Buu.., Apr.-June 1996, at 19-31; Checklist of 1995 Shareholder Proposals, supra note
107, at 21-31. Proposals to restrict nonemployee director pensions are still popular, but their
numbers are declining due to voluntary corporate action. See Eliminate Director Pensions,
CoRP. GOVERNANCE Buu , Oct. 1996-Jan. 1997, at 3.
..

115. There were 352 no-action requests by April 4, 1996, six percent fewer than at the
same time the previous year. See Vmeeta Anand, Companies Opt for Peace: Shareholder
Fighting Subdued in 1996 Meeting Season, PENSIONS & lNvEsrMENTS, Apr. 15, 1996, at 19.
116. See Checklist of 1996 Shareholder Proposals, supra note 114.
117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(10) (1996).
118. See Checklist of 1997 Shareholder Proposals, supra note 109.
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are aimed at remedying personal grievances.119 Such proposals
would be excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(4).120
1.

Procedural Objections to Labor's Shareholder Proposals:
Rule 14a-8(a) (4) and the Alter Ego Problem

Rule 14a-8 has a number of procedural requirements that share
holders must satisfy. The one that has been applied most recently
to labor unions is Rule 14a-8(a)(4), which limits labor and other

shareholders to submitting "no more than one proposal and an ac

companying supporting statement for inclusion in the registrant's
proxy materials . . . . "121 Shareholders may not submit alternative
proposals for inclusion in the event their initial proposal is not
included.122
This rule becomes an issue when a union or other shareholder

attempts to avoid the one-proposal limitation by having persons
they control submit additional proposals.123 Companies often have
objected to proposals submitted by multiple employee-shareholders

on the ground that all of the proponents are acting on behalf of a
union and hence should be restricted to submission of one collec
tive proposal.
When faced with this issue, the SEC has stated that if one em

ployee proponent is the "alter ego" of another proponent, or con

trols another proponent, it will require them to choose just one
proposal to submit to the company.124 In some situations, the

119. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 274,
at *1 (Feb. 10, 1997); Frontier Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 139,
at *1 (Jan. 23, 1997).
120. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(4).
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(4).
122. See Southeast Banking Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1885, at *1-*2 (Feb. 8, 1982).
123. See Pacific Enters., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 194, at *1-*2
(Feb. 12, 1996).
124. See Pacific Enters., 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 194, at *2; Consolidated Freightways,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 256, at *2 (Feb. 23, 1994); Consoli
dated Freightways, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 213, at *2 (Feb. 9,
1994); Jefferson-Pilot Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 353, at *1-*2
(Mar. 12, 1992). As Linda Quinn and Andrea Menaker note:
Companies have sought to exclude proposals sponsored by unions or union members on
two grounds: one procedural, the other substantive. Procedurally, the company may
contend that such proposals are submitted on behalf of the union, and that these union
members are simply "nominal" proponents. Thus, the company may argue that the pro
posals should be excluded as exceeding the one proposal per proponent limit of Rule
14a-8(a)(4).
Linda C. Quinn & Andrea J. Menaker, The Shareholder Proposal Process, in A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES 16-9 (A. Goodman & J. Olson eds., 2d
ed. 1992 & Supp. 1997). Quinn and Menaker further cite Rule 14a-8(c)(4), the "personal
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union's actions are sufficient to indicate that it controls the other
proponents, typically union members. For example, the SEC
granted no-action relief to one company where the union initially
submitted six shareholder proposals under its own name, then,
upon learning of the one-proposal limitation, resubmitted the pro
posals separately in its own name and that of several union
members.125
In most situations, however, it will be very difficult for a com
pany to succeed in obtaining relief under the alter-ego theory.
Generally speaking, a showing that the proponent's union prepared
the Rule 14a-8 proposal and supporting statement will not by itself
lead to a grant of no-action relief for the company.126 Furthermore,
the SEC has determined that a union's provision of legal and cleri
cal assistance to its members who are submitting shareholder pro
posals is not enough by itself to demonstrate that such members are
merely nominal proponents acting for a union.127 During the 1996
proxy season, the SEC began issuing a new response to companies'
requests to exclude proposals on this basis, "indicating that based
on the facts provided by both sides, the staff was unable to conclude
whether or not the proponent was acting on behalf of another per
son. "128 This places a heavy burden on companies seeking to ex
clude proposals on this ground.129 The SEC now appears to require
clear evidence of abuse of the proposal process before permitting
the company to exclude the proposal.130
Only one company seeking to exclude a union members' pro
posals met the SEC's burden during the 1996 season.13 1 A review
grievance" exclusion, as the second, substantive reason for claiming these proposals should
be excluded. See id.
125. See Pacific Enters., 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 194.
126. See Quinn & Menaker, supra note 124, at 16-10 n.26.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 16-10 (citing Consolidated Freightways, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC
No-Act LEXIS 158 (Feb. 1, 1996), and Panhandle E. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996
SEC No-Act LEXIS 8 (Jan. 3, 1996)). According to Quinn & Menaker, the SEC staff "[i]n
so responding . . . [has] made it clear that in not issuing a no-action letter it was not rejecting
the company's position, but rather taking no position at all on the merits of the [(a)(4)]
argument." Id.
129. The "change" in the SEC's position on this issue has been attributed to union lobby
ing of SEC Chair Arthur Levitt and then-Corporation Finance Division director Linda
Quinn. See Robert S. Reder & Philip Berkowitz, Recent Developments in Proxy Contests, in
DOING DEALS 1996, at 575, 644 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-930,
1996).
130. See id. at 645.
131. See Abigail Arms, Current Issues and Rulemaking Projects: Division of Corporation
Finance-Securities and Exchange Commission, in NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION
1996, at 179 (PLI Comm. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. A-513, 1996). The com·
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of the no-action letters available on LEXIS found only one com
pany during the 1997 season challenging a shareholder proposal on
the ground that the proposal was submitted by the alter ego of a
union.132
2.

Substantive Objections to Labor's Shareholder Proposals

Some corporations have resisted labor's efforts to use the share
holder-proposal rule by seeking to exclude labor proposals under
the substantive provisions of Rule 14a-8(c).133 Companies faced
with labor-shareholder proposals usually argue for exclusion on the
ground that the proposal either (1) relates to the redress of a per
sonal claim or grievance against the company or is designed to fur
ther a personal interest of the proponent which is not shared with
the other security holders at large - the "personal grievance" ex
clusion in 14a-8(c)(4),134 or (2) deals with a matter relating to the
conduct of the ordinary business operations of the company - the
"ordinary business" exclusion in 14a-8(c)(7).135 Unions increas
ingly are able to thwart these substantive objections, in large part
because their proposals look like the proposals of other large, insti
tutional investors.
a. Rule 14a-8(c) (4): "Personal Grievance" Exclusion. Manage
ment frequently tries to exclude labor proposals under Rule 14a8(c)(4), the "personal grievance" exemption.136 The SEC adopted
this exemption to prevent a shareholder from harassing an issuer
into giving the proponent some particular benefit not shared by
other shareholders, or to accomplish objectives particular to the
proponent and not to other shareholders.137 The basis for this ex
clusion is an administrative concern that "the costs of vindicating an
pany was Pacific Enterprises, which received two proposals from the Utility Workers. See
Pacific Enters., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 194, at *l (Feb. 12, 1996).
132. See Frontier Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 155, at *3
(Jan. 23, 1997). Frontier challenged a proposal submitted by R. Flavin, the president of the
CWA local that had also submitted a proposal to the company. Mr. Flavin withdrew his
proposal before the SEC acted on Frontier's request. See Frontier Corp., 1997 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 155, at *l.
133. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1996).
134. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(4).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7). We should also mention that there are other grounds on
which the company can seek no-action relief from the SEC. For further discussion of these
exclusions, see THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.04.
136. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)-8(c)(4). For further discussion of the history of § (c)(4) and its
interpretation, see THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.04(D).
137. See TuoMAs & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.04(D).
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individual shareholder's personal interests should not be shifted to
the issuer and hence indirectly to all other shareholders. "138
The SEC has not uniformly handled company challenges to
labor-shareholder proposals under 14a-8(c)(4).139 The SEC's pres
ent position with regard to labor-shareholder proposals is that em
ployees have the same rights as other shareholders to offer these
proposals. Proposals may not be excluded based only on the con
tention that the proponent is acting in the interests of union mem
bers. To exclude a labor-shareholder proposal, the company must
present concrete, noncircumstantial evidence that the proposal is
merely another tactic in the union's corporate campaign.140 The
burden is on the company to show that the proposal qualifies for
exclusion.141 In recent no-action letters, the SEC has tended to per
mit labor-shareholder proposals that relate to facially neutral cor
porate-governance issues.142
b. Rule 14a-8(c) (7): "Ordinary Business" Exclusion. Corpora
tions frequently try to exclude labor-shareholder proposals on the
ground that they relate to the ordinary business of the company
under Rule 14a-8(c)(7). This "ordinary business" provision permits
a co�pany to exclude social- and public-policy proposals that relate
to the day-to-day business affairs of the corporation.143
The SEC's interpretation of this provision has shifted over the
years.144 For many years prior to 1992, the SEC interpreted the
rule to mean that shareholder proposals involving substantial policy
considerations could not be omitted from proxy materials pursuant
to the ordinary-business exception, even if they raised issues other138. Id.
139. See Vmeeta Anand, Employee-Shareholders: An Angry New Voice, PENSIONS & IN·
VESTMENTS, Apr. 4, 1994, at 26; Patrick S. McGum, SEC Holds Key to Labor Shareholder
Proposals, CoRP. GOVERNANCE Buu., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 9; Leslie Scism, Labor Unions In
creasingly Initiate Proxy Proposals, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1994, at Cl.
140. See 4 Loms Loss & JoEL SEUGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2020 (3d ed. 1990);
McGum, supra note 139, at 10 (quoting William E. Morley, senior associate director, Divi
sion of Corporate Fmance, SEC).
141. See Beth Duncan, SEC Streamlining Its Handling of No-Action Letters, Quinn Says,
BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, June 15, 1995, at A12, Al3 (reporting the remarks of
Linda C. Qninn, Director, Division of Corporation Fmance, SEC, at the 7th Annual General
Counsel Conference, June 13, 1995).
142. See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.04(D), for further discussion of these is
sues. Cf. Thomas & Martin, supra note 6.
143. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c}(7). The rationale for the exclusion is that manage
ment's exercise of its specialized talents should be protected from investors attempting to
dictate the minutiae of daily business decisions. See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3,
§ 16.04(G).
144. See TuoMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.04(G), for a further discussion of the his
tory of this provision.
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wise relating to the ordinary business of the corporation.145 In
1992, the SEC reversed this interpretation in a no-action letter to

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., advising the company that
it could omit a proposal addressing discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation under (c)(7), even though the proposal raised

social-policy concems.146 The shareholder-proponent of the propo
sal challenged this change in federal court and won in the district
court, only to be reversed on appeal by the Second Circuit.14'

After the Second Circuit's decision, the SEC resumed148 issuing
no-action letters to companies stating that shareholder proposals
that relate to the corporation's ordinary business but which also
raise substantial social-policy considerations can be omitted from
proxy materials pursuant to the "ordinary business" exception.149
Thus, employment-related shareholder proposals may be omitted
from proxy statements if they deal with ordinary business issues,
even when they also raise important social-policy concems.150
So far in the 1997 season, only two companies appear to have
raised the "ordinary business" exemption in seeking to exclude
labor-union proposals: Philip Morris's challenge to the Teamsters'
proposal for an independent compensation committee on (c)(7)
grounds was denied,151 while Lockheed Martin's request to omit a
union proposal on those grounds was allowed.152
145. See id.
146. See Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL
289095, at *1-*3 (Oct. 13, 1992).
147. See New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y.
1994), revd., 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
148. After refusing to consider Rule 14a-8(c)(7) challenges during the pendency of litiga
tion, the SEC began issuing no-action letters in May 1995, when it concurred with BE Aero
space's argument that NYCERS' proposal to implement or increase activity on the McBride
principles could be excluded. See BE Aerospace, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No
Act. LEXIS 527, at *1 (May 31, 1995). The McBride principles ask that employers doing
business in Northern Ireland promote equal employment opportunities for Catholics and
Protestants in Northern Ireland and prohibit sexual harassment. See Dorning, supra note 27;
Andrew J. Hoffman, A Strategic Response to Investor Activism, 37 SLOAN MGMr. REv. 51, 53
(1996).
149. See Duncan, supra note 141, at A12.
150. See Ken Bertsch, Court Reverses Cracker Barrel Decision; Equal Employment Reso
lutions in Doubt, NEws FOR lNvEsToRS, Jan. 1995, at 1. As of this writing, the SEC is review
ing its policies on this question, and it appears likely that it will reverse its position once
again. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
IC-22,828, 1997 WL 578696 at *12 (Sept. 18, 1997) [hereinafter SEC Proposals].
151. See Philip Morris Cos., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act LEXIS 218,
at *1 (Jan. 30, 1997).
152. The CWAIITU Negotiated Pension Plan's proposal would have mandated that "the
board of directors . . . evaluate whether the company has a legal compliance program that
adequately reviews conflicts of interest and the hiring of former government officials and
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Empirical Studies of Unions' and Other Shareholders'
Corporate-Governance Proposals

A variety of empirical studies have focused on the utility of
shareholder proposals, looking at whether other shareholders sup
port them and whether they lead to measurable improvements in
corporate performance. Only one study, however, ha$ focused spe
cifically on labor-sponsored shareholder proposals, so we begin
with a discussion of it.
a. Shareholder Support for Labor's Shareholder Voting Initia

Using data from the 1994 proxy season, Thomas and Martin
examined how voting support differs for corporate-governance pro
posals sponsored by labor as compared with other shareholder
groups.153 After controlling for the type of shareholder proposal
and the company's ownership structure, they found that: "(1)
labor-sponsored proposals received a statistically significantly
higher percentage of favorable votes than did similar proposals
sponsored by private institutions and individuals; and (2) labor
sponsored proposals obtained approximately the same percentage
of votes as proposals sponsored by public institutions."154 These
findings support the conclusion that shareholders view labor-share
holder corporate-governance proposals no differently than they
view similar proposals submitted by other groups of shareholders.
These conclusions are subject to the challenge that labor pro
posals arise in two contexts: general corporate-governance propos
als for which all shareholders share the same interest in improving
corporate-governance structures, and situations in which labor has
a conflict of interest with other shareholders because it is trying to
further its interests as workers. To explore these issues, Thomas
and Martin focused on a subsample of proposals identified by a
management-oriented group as specific instances in which labor
used the shareholder-proposal mechanism as part of a corporate
campaign.155 While these labor proposals received a slightly lower
percentage of favorable votes than other similar proposals, the dif
ferences were not statistically significant.156 This suggests that,
even in situations in which labor is battling management over other
issues, such as collective-bargaining negotiations, shareholders contives.

employees and . . . prepare a report on its findings." Lockheed Martin, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 208, at *1 (Jan. 29, 1997).
153. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 6.
154. Id. (manuscript at 7-8).
155. See id. (manuscript at 8).
156. See id.
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tinue to treat labor corporate-governance proposals no differently
than those submitted by other shareholder groups.
b. The Financial Impact of Shareholder Proposals. A variety of
studies have attempted to measure the impact of shareholder cor
porate-governance proposals on firm value. Two studies have
found little evidence that these proposals have any effect on target
firm performance. Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling studied 866
shareholder corporate-governance proposals at 317 publicly traded
companies between March 1986 and October 1990.157 They found
that, while these proposals were targeted at poorly performing com
panies, they had little impact on firm policies or firm value.15s
In another study of the impact of shareholder corporate-govern
ance proposals, Wahal looked at firms targeted by nine major insti
tutional investors between 1987 and 1993.159 Wahal found that,
although the funds were relatively successful in getting companies
to adopt these corporate-governance reforms, the changes did not
·
result in significant improvements in the companies'
performances.160
These studies may not adequately measure the impact of union
shareholder proposals for two reasons. First, they do not control
for the sponsor of the proposals. Thus, they cannot examine the
difference between proposals by labor unions and other sponsors.
Second, these studies use data for periods prior to the rise of union
shareholder activism. Thus, they tell us little about the financial
effects of union-sponsored proposals. Further research is needed to
determine if these general results apply to the union-sponsored pro
posals of recent years.161
Studies by Strickland, Wtles, and Zenner,162 Opler and
Sokobin,163 and Bizak and Marquette,164 by contrast, have found
157. See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives:
Empirical Evidence (May 8, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
158. See id. at 30-31.
159. See Sunil Wahal, Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance, 31 J. FIN. & QUAN
TITATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (1996). The nine funds include public pension funds from the states of
California, Colorado, Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wrsconsin, and CREF.
160. See id. at 3.
161. Martin and Thomas are currently in the process of examining the impact of labor
unions' and other sponsor groups' shareholder proposals on various measures of economic
performance.
162. See Dean Strickland et al., A Requiem for the USA : Is Small Shareholder Monitor
ing Effective?, 40 J. FIN. EcoN. 319 (1996).
163. See Tun Opler & Jonathan Sokobin, Does Coordinated Institutional Activism Work?
An Analysis of the Activities of the Council of Institutional Investors (visited July 17, 1997)
<http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/-fin/faculty/opler/ciiabs.htin>.
164. See Bizjak & Marquette, supra note 68.
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positive effects on firm value from institutional-shareholder activ
ism. Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner examined efforts of the United
Shareholders Association (USA) to monitor management perform
ance during its existence from

1986-1993.

They found that the USA

proposals to alter corporate-governance ·structures and settlements
of these proposals resulted in positive abnormal stock price returns
of roughly

$39

0.9%

during a two-day event window, or approximately

million per firm, for a total of

$1.3

billion for all firms in the

sample.165 They found no increases · in firm value relating to pro
posals concerning poison pills or golden parachutes.166
Opler and Sokobin tracked the performance of firms identified
by the Council of Institutional Investors as poor performers during

1991-1993.

They found that in the sample years following their ap

pearance on the CIT list, these firms outperformed the S&P

500

by

an average of eight percent.167 They argue that this improved per
formance was the result of the institutional investors' monitoring
efforts in a coordinated and quiet strategy to improve corporate
governance at these firms.
Fmally, Bizjak and Marquette examined

193

firms in which

shareholders submitted proposals to rescind the company's poison
pill antitakeover defenses between

1987

and

1993.

They found evi

dence that poison pills were more likely to be restructured when
there was a shareholder resolution and that these restructurings
were associated with increases in shareholder value.168 They also
examined whether the identity of the sponsor of the proposal af
fected the likelihood of a pill restructuring and found that pension
fund proposals had the greatest likelihood of success.169 Bizjak and
Marquette concluded that their results supported claims that share
holder resolutions to rescind poison pills have some effect on man
agers' actions and that shareholders monitor managerial behavior.

165. See Strickland et al., supra note 162, at 321.
166. See id. at 333-35. They did find that other potential benefits included more monitor
ing effort by outside directors, increased SEC regulation of executive compensation disclo
sures, increased activism by other shareholders, especially public pension funds, and
competitive pressure on other firms in the industry. See id. at 336-37.
167. See Opler & Sokobin, supra note 163, at 7.
168. See Bizjak & Marquette, supra note 68 (manuscript at 3).
169. Unions sponsored 16 of the shareholder resolutions in their sample. See id. (manu
script at 5). Union sponsorship is a positive and significant explanatory variable for pill reso
lutions that receive more than half of the votes cast at the annual shareholder meeting, but
not in their other equations. See id. tbls.4-7. Compare id. app. tbl.5 with id. app. tbl.4.
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While it is difficult to generalize froin these studies and related
studies,170 we believe that they demonstrate two broad trends.
First, changes in corporate-governance structures alone do not re
sult in increases in firm value. If these changes are coupled with
improved shareholder monitoring and related effects, however,
they can lead to small but significant increases in value for all share
holders. If this is correct, it means that union-shareholder activists
must couple their voting initiatives with continued monitoring ef
forts in order to bring about increases in firm value. We discuss
these issues more in Parts IV and V below.
B.

Mandatory Bylaw Amendment Shareholder Proposals Under
Rule l 4a-8 and the Fleming Companies Decision

Labor unions have recently begun using Rule 14a-8 to present
proposals for changes to a company's bylaws for a binding share
holder vote.171 State corporate law generally grants shareholders
the unilateral right to amend corporate bylaws.172 The grant of sim
ilar powers to the board of directors in a company's articles of in
corporation or bylaws usually does not divest this right,173 although
a charter provision may explicitly deny shareholders the power to
initiate a bylaw amendment.174
State law usually has not imposed express limits on the sub
stance of corporate bylaws or shareholder-initiated amendments to
the bylaws. Thus, shareholders arguably may address through by170. See, e.g., Teresa Ghilarducci et al., Labour's Paradoxical Interests and the Evolution
of Corporate Governance {1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors); see also
Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism:
Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 898 {1996). See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER &
ROBERT W. VrsHNY, A SURVEY OF CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE {National Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 5554, 1996).
171. Rule 14a-8 generally permits shareholders to submit binding resolutions on matters
that state law commits to the shareholder body. See TuoMAs & DIXON, supra note 3,
§ 16.04{A), for a further discussion of the issues discussed in this section. In other situations,
the Commission staff has required that a mandatory proposal for action that would run afoul
of (c){l) be recast as precatory in order to be included on the proxy statement. See id.
172. See Bevis Longstreth & Nancy Kane, Shareholders' Growing Role in Executive Com
pensation (pt. 2), N.Y. LJ., Feb. 27, 1992, at 5; see also DEL. CoDE ANN tit. 8, § 109 {1991);
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 601 (McKinney 1986); MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 10.20 {1996). See
generally THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.04{A).
173. See R. Franklin Balotti & Daniel A. Dreisbach, The Permissible Scope of Share
holder Bylaw Amendments in Delaware, 1 CoRP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Oct.-Nov. 1992, at
19, 19; Kenneth J. Bialkin & Richard J. Grossman, The Permissible Scope of Shareholder
Bylaw Amendments in New York, 1 CoRP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Oct.-Nov. 1992, at 25, 25;
see also DEL. CoDE ANN tit. 8, § 109{a) {1991); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 60l(a) (McKinney
1986).
174. See DEL. CoDE ANN tit. 8, § 109{a) {1991); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 60l{a) (McKin
ney 1986).
.

.

.
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law amendments any aspect of the business or affairs of the corpo
ration or the respective rights and powers of the board and
shareholders that is not barred explicitly by state law or the corpo
ration's certificate of incorporation.175 At some point, however,
this broad shareholder power to adopt or amend corporate bylaws
must yield to the board's authority to manage the business and af
fairs of the corporation.176 The problem becomes one of drawing
the exact line between the respective authorities of directors and
shareholders under the relevant state law.
A federal district court in Oklahoma addressed these issues in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund v. Fleming
Companies, Inc.177 The case developed out of a Teamsters' share
holder proposal at Fleming Companies for the 1997 annual meeting
to amend the company's bylaws to redeem the current poison pill;
require that the board of directors submit to shareholders its plan
for any future poison pill; and prohibit the board from adopting the
plan unless a majority of shareholders approved it.178 Fleming re
sponded by filing a declaratory action in state court seeking a ruling
that the proposal violated Oklahoma state law.179 The Teamsters in
turn filed a federal suit alleging a violation of Rule 14a-8 and seek175. See Longstreth & Kane, supra note 172, at 5; see also DBI.. CooE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 109(b) (1991); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 601(c) (McKinney 1986). According to Longstreth
and Kane,
[i]t is highly doubtful, as a matter of statutory construction, that shareholders, who are
expressly given the right to adopt or amend by-laws, which . . . may contain provisions
relating to the business and affairs of the corporation and the relative rights and powers
of directors and shareholders, are nonetheless preempted from exercising this right in
connection with any subject matter that directors have authority to address under their
power to manage.
Longstreth & Kane, supra note 172, at 5.
176. See Bialkin & Grossman, supra note 173, at 26-27 (observing that precisely where
that point of irreconcilable conflict is reached under New York law is unclear, but concluding
that shareholders likely would be barred from adopting bylaw amendments that unduly re
stricted the board's ability to determine corporate-governance and executive-compensation
matters); see also Balotti & Dreisbach, supra note 173, at 21.
177. See International Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., No. CIV-96-1650-A,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2980 (WD. Okla. Jan. 24, 1997) (granting plaintiff's motion for sum
mary judgment requiring the company to include shareholder proposals in its proxy materi
als); International Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., No. CIV-96-1650-A, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2979 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 19, 1997) (denying defendant's motion to suspend
injunction pending appeal). For further analysis of this decision, see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Bylaw Barricades: Union and Shareholder Rights, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 27, 1997, at 5.
178. See Fleming Cos., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 885, at *3 (Dec.
3, 1996). The proposal was made after the Teamsters' General Fund submitted a proposal
requesting that the company redeem its poison pill during the 1996 proxy season, which re
ceived 64% of the shareholder vote. See 1996 SEC No-Act. 885, at *14. The Fleming board
responded to the vote by voting to renew the poison pill until 2006.
179. See Fleming Cos. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund, No. CJ-96-6110
(Okla. Dist. Ct. Sept. 6, 1996).
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ing declaratory and injunctive relief ordering the company to in
clude the resolution in its proxy materials and proxy cards for the
1997 annual shareholders' meeting.180
In both cases, the courts were asked to determine whether
shareholders could amend the bylaws so as to limit the board of
directors' statutory decisionmaking authority. Oklahoma law pro
vides that every domestic corporation "may create and issue . . .
rights or options entitling the holders thereof to purchase from the
corporation any shares of its capital stock," subject to any provi
sions in the certificate of incorporation.181 Under this provision,
the board claimed to have the power, subject to the certificate of
incorporation - which was silent on the matter - to implement a
shareholder rights plan, as such plans involve the creation of rights
to

purchase

the

company's

s ecurities

under

sp ecified

circumstances.182
The Teamsters argued that the board�s power to implement a
rights plan could be curtailed by shareholder action, pointing out
that Oklahoma law gives shareholders the ultimate power to amend
the corporate bylaws, which can be neither divested nor limited by
the board,183 and that it further provides that "the bylaws may con
tain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate
of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the
conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or
powers of its shareholders, directors, officers or employees. "184
Fleming Companies responded that the Teamsters' proposal, be-

180. See Fleming Cos., 1996
181.

SEC No-Act. LEXIS 885, at *9-*10.

'

OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1038 (1991).

182. See Fleming Cos., 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 885, at *10-*11. Tue SEC declined to
issue a determination or comment on the company's arguments due to the pending litigation.
See 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 885, at *1.
183.

OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1013(A) (1991) provides:

Tue original or other bylaws of a corporation may be adopted, amended or repealed by
the incorporators, by the initial directors if they were named in the certificate of incorpo
ration, or, before a corporation has received any payment for any of its stock, by its
board of directors. After a corporation has received any payment for any of its stock,
the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the shareholders entitled to vote,
or, in the case of a nonstock corporation, in its members entitled to vote; provided,
however, any corporation, in its certificate of incorporation, may confer the power to
adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors or, in the case of a nonstock corpora
tion, upon its governing body by whatever name designated. Tue fact that such power
has been so conferred upon the directors or governing body, as the case may be, shall
not divest the shareholders or members of the power, nor limit their power to adopt,
amend or repeal bylaws.
184.

OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1013(B).
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cause it would limit the directors' statutory power, violated
Oklahoma law. 185
The federal district court ruled in favor of the Teamsters.186 It
found that the directors had the power to adopt any rights plan they
desired under Oklahoma law, subject to the subsequent approval of
the shareholders.187 Fleming Companies has appealed the district
court's decision,188 although the company's directors terminated the
current poison pill plan, effective April 30, 1997. 189
Given the similarity between the Oklahoma and Delaware stat
utes, the district court's decision could have profound implications
for labor groups' and other shareholders' ability to force companies
to change their antitakeover defenses and corporate-governance
structures. Other shareholders undoubtedly
these proposals. 190

"

will offer a lot" of

Boards of directors faced with these types of mandatory bylaw
amendments, or the threat of such amendments, will need to take
unions' actions very seriously or risk becoming takeover targets of
potential acquirors alerted to their vulnerability by a successful
shareholder vote. Unions that are frustrated with the more passive
forms of shareholder activism, or with traditional labor organizing
efforts, now have another avenue for gaining influence with
companies.191
185. See Transcript of Oral Arguments on Motions for Summary Judgment at 25, 28, In
ternational Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Co., No. CIV-96-1650-A, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2980 {W.D. Okla. Jan. 24, 1997). The Teamsters responded that Fleming's position
with regard to § 1038 would render § 1013(B) wholly ineffective, in that it suggests that the
shareholders also could not adopt bylaws that relate to the business and affairs of the corpo
ration, something over which Oklahoma law also granted the directors authority. See 'Il'an
script at 14-15.
186. See Transcript at 30-32.
187. See 'Il'anscript at 31. The judge cited two additional considerations that went "be
yond the face of the statutes": his reservations regarding granting directors, the "constitu
ency in corporate governance that is most likely to be viewing the situation in light of self
interest," with exclusive power to make decisions under § 1038, see Transcript at 31, and his
reservations about putting issues affecting the marketability of shares beyond the cognizance
of "the people who really care about the marketability of shares," see Transcript at 32. The
judge also noted that Fleming's decision to ignore the shareholder's "large majority vote" on
the poison pill exerted "a tug" on his decision. See Transcript at 32.
188. See Bertsch & McGeary, supra note 35, at 1; see also International Bhd. of Teamsters
Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., No. CIV-96-1650-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2979 (W.D. Okla.
Feb. 19, 1997) {denying defendant's motion to suspend injunction pending appeal).
189. See Fleming Cos., supra note 36.
190. See Anand, supra note 95, at 20 (quoting Howard Sherman, President of Institu
tional Shareholder Services, Inc., a well-known shareholder advisory firm).
191. Several unions have proposed a variety of bylaw amendments at various companies.
These proposals include the redemption of poison pills, elimination of classified boards, and
adoption of confidential voting policies. See Coffee, supra note 177, at 127. UNITE has filed
a federal lawsuit challenging May Department Stores's actions in responding to its
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Shareholder Resolutions at the Annual Meeting and Corporate
Management's Responses
Unions that want to get their proposals before the company's

shareholders have another alternative to the shareholder proposal
rule - they can present the proposal in their capacity as ·a share
holder of the company at the annual shareholders' meeting, subject
to satisfaction of the company's advance notice bylaws, if any exist.
According to the IRRC, seventeen floor resolutions were intro:.
duced in this manner during the
labor groups.192

1996

proxy season, fourteen by

Labor groups have introduced floor resolutions at annual share
holders' meetings in an effort to increase pressure on employers
with whom they have a dispute. For example, in the

1996

proxy

season, the Teamsters announced such a proposal and indepen
dently solicited proxies from Gannett shareholders at a time when a
Teamsters local was engaged in a lengthy strike against Detroit
Newspaper Agency, a joint operating agency between Gannett's
Detroit News and Knight-Ridder's Detroit Free Press.193 In a re
lated matter, the Teamsters conducted an independent proxy solici
tation in support of its proposal to separate the chair and CEO
positions at Union Pacific, of which one Gannett director, Drew
Lewis, is the Chair and CEO. The supplemental material Union
Pacific submitted to its shareholders, which included a revised
proxy card, claimed that the Teamsters' action was due in part to its
attempts to convince nonunion employees at Overnite Transporta
tion Company, a Union Pacific subsidiary, to join the union.194
During the

1996 proxy season, the UFCW's Local 99R similarly

filed proposals at Albertson's and at five other companies identified
through interlocking directorates.195 It submitted a total of eleven
proposals regarding confidential voting, votes on future golden

mandatory bylaw amendment See Complaint, UNITE v. The May Dept. Stores Co., No. 97
Civ. 2120 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 30, 1997).
192. See I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 4.
193. See Gannett Co., Preliminary Proxy Statement 23 (Mar. 22, 1996), available in
EDGAR, Film No. 96,537,462.
194. See Union Pac. Corp., Definitive Additional Materials 1 (Apr. 5, 1996), available in
EDGAR, Ftlm No. 96,544,406.
195. See I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 4. Each of the targeted companies
has directors who are also directors on Albertson's board. See Albertson's, Inc., Preliminary
Proxy Statement 6-9 (Mar. 29, 1996), available in EDGAR, Ftlm No. 96,540,623.
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parachutes, declassifying the board, and redeeming the poison
pill.196 These proposals are summarized in Table 3.197
In 1997, the UFCW Local again is targeting Albertson's, in addi
tion to six companies that share directors with Albertson's.198 Pre
liminary proxy materials indicate that the UFCW's Phoenix Local is
engaged in negotiations over a successor contract and is also at
tempting to unionize other Albertson's employees in Arizona.199
The company has refused the Local's request to be voluntarily rec
ognized as the representative of its currently nonunion workers and
has instead insisted on "NLRB elections, which are slower and
often more expensive to shareholders (they often result in years of
litigation) ."200 The floor resolutions that the Local intends to intro
duce regard declassifying the board at Boeing, Boise Cascade, and
Questar; confidential voting at Albertson's and Heritage Media;
and redeeming a poison pill at Pier i .201 Table 3 in the appendix
contains more information on the UFCW's
initiatives.202

1997

shareholder

The UFCW appears to have chosen these proposals carefully to
appeal to most shareholder groups. According to I.R.R.C. data,
proposals raising these issues received an average of 42.1 % of the
vote for board declassification resolutions, 31.5% for confidential
voting resolutions, and 53.4% for poison pill redemption resolu
tions, of the votes cast by shareholders at other companies in the
1996 proxy season.203 In particular, I.R.R.C. data show that pro196. See I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 4.
197. See infra app. tbl.3.
198. See CoUNCIL OF INSTL. lNvEsroRS LETTER, supra note 26, at 2.
199. See Albertson's, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Jan. 28, 1997) available in
EDGAR, Ftlm No. 97,512,181. The UFCW has attempted to organize employees at 28 Al
bertson's stores in Arizona. See Rani Cher Monson, Unions Fail to Change Albertson's,
IDAHO STATESMAN, May 25, 1996, at SB.
200. See Albertson's, Inc., supra note 199. The AFL-CIO now advocates the strategy of
avoiding an NLRB election and obtaining voluntary recognition from employers once au
thorization cards have been signed by a majority of employees. See Bernstein, supra note 54,
at 56.
201. Information is not yet available on the resolution(s) the UFCW intends to submit to
TIS Mortgage Investment Company shareholders. See COUNCIL OF lNSTL. INVESTORS
LETTER, supra note 26, at 3.
202. See infra app. tbl.3.
203. See I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 1-2; Declassify Boards, CoRP.
GOVERNANCE BULL., Oct 1996-Jan. 1997, at 9 (listing companies expecting shareholder de
classification proposals). The 1996 Summary listed the percentages as noted above, with one
exception. It indicated that 42.3% of shareholders supported proposals to declassify the
board, but also noted that this figure included a proposal supported by management and that
without that proposal, the figure was lower. The October-January publication states that
42.l % of shareholders supported board declassification proposals. See Declassify Boards,
supra, at 9.
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posals advocating declassifying the board received more support
than proposals about other board issues. Likewise, confidential
voting received more support on average than proposals raising any
other voting issue. Proposals to redeem poison pills received
greater support on average than proposals concerning any other an
titakeover issue.204 Thus, the introduction of these particular issues
appears to reflect an effort to choose those issues that have a
greater probability of success and that are therefore likely to place
more pressure on the targeted employer.
This illustrates the point we raised in Part II: it is no accident
that unions are on the cutting edge of new voting methods in this
area. When they have been unsuccessful in getting the results they
desire using traditional labor tactics or precatory Rule 14a-8 pro
posals, they have used innovative voting approaches designed to ap
peal to a broad cross-section of shareholders.
Labor unions' submission of floor resolutions allows them to by
pass the restrictions in Rule 14a-8. Thus, a union may inform a
company of its intention to introduce a resolution at the annual
meeting without regard to the 120-day deadline in 14a-8(a)(3) and
may do so without holding the requisite number of shares for the
one-year period as required in 14a-8(a)(l).205 A union also may
submit more than the one-proposal maximum in 14a-8(a)(4). Thus,
floor resolutions can raise multiple issues, seek binding changes to
corporate structures, and be placed on the ballot with little notice to
the company.
To gain support for these proposals, a union may seek to use the
company's proxy materials to solicit shareholder support, or it may
launch its own solicitation. It is much cheaper and more effective
for a union if the company includes the proposal in its proxy materi
als by making disclosure concerning the proposal and including a
line on its proxy card for shareholders to vote on the proposal.
Companies have several options when they know that a union
will try to place a proposal before the shareholder meeting.206 If
204. See I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 1-2.
205. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 455,
at *4 (Apr. 18, 1996) (observing that the UFCW informed the company of its intention to
submit its resolution days before proxy materials were to be sent to shareholders); Union
Pac. Corp., supra note 194, at 1 (observing that the Teamsters purchased shares of Union
Pacific stock "a few days" before notifying the company of its plan to introduce its proposal
at the annual meeting).
206. For example, in the 1996 proxy season Albertson's included on its original proxy
card the UFCW's proposal and provided the company's statement in opposition in its materi
als. See Albertson's, Inc., supra note 195, at 25-27. Boeing, targeted in the 1997 season, has
agreed to include UFCW's proposal on its proxy card and has submitted the company's state-
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the company is aware of the proposal sufficiently early, then it may
choose to include the union's proposal and supporting statement in
the company's proxy materials, just as it would any shareholder
proposal. If the company decides to do this, however, "the propo
sal is likely to get a high vote, comparable to any 'normal' share
holder proposal. Albertson's and Questar handled union proposals
this way [in 1996] . . . and the proposals drew support ranging from
21 % to 38%."207
Not surprisingly, some companies have chosen not to take this
path. If the union is forced to raise the proposal at the meeting
without any advance notice to the shareholders through the com
pany materials, then most proxies already will have been voted. A
proposal presented in this manner will probably not be able to gar
ner many votes, even if the union is able to do some solicitation
prior to or at the meeting. Thus, some union proposals that were
not included in the company's proxy materials and original proxy
cards drew votes of less than one or two percent.2os
As discussed more fully below,209 however, if the company is
informed about the union's proposal in sufficient time prior to the
meeting to include the proposal in its proxy materials and chooses
not to include it, then the corporation must inform its shareholders
that the proposal exists, as well as, if the company intends to use its
discretionary voting authority to vote on the proposal, how the
company plans to vote the proxies it receives. If the company fails
to make this disclosure, then, subject to certain limitations, the SEC
has opined that the company will be unable to exercise discretion
ary voting authority to vote the proxies it receives on the propo
sal.210 In fact, in 1996, some companies decided to revise their
proxy materials and send out new proxy cards carrying a union's
proposal after learning that the union shareholder intended to
make the proposal at the annual meeting.211
ment in its proxy materials. See Boeing Co., Preliminary Proxy Statement 36-37 (Feb. 28,
1997), available in EDGAR, Ftlm No. 97,548,485. Boise Cascade, targeted in the 1997 sea
son, has included a statement indicating that it is aware of the UFCW's intention to introduce
its proposal and that the company reserves the right to exercise its discretionary authority to
vote against the proposal if it should be presented. See Boise Cascade Corp., Definitive
Proxy Statement 7 (Mar. 5, 1997), available in EDGAR, Ftlm No. 97,550,629.
207. CoUNCIL OF lNSTL. !NvEsToRS LETrER, supra note 26, at 2.
208. See id.
209. See infra section ill.C.2.
210. See infra section ill.C.2 for further discussion of this point.
211. See Union Pac. Corp., supra note 194.
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Unions may choose to do their own solicitations in favor of their
proposals, subject to the restrictions in the federal proxy rules.
These solicitations are conducted outside of the limitations of Rule
14a-8 unless the proposal is presented thereunder, but they are sub
ject to the remainder of the federal proxy rules. They can be di
rected at the entire shareholder body or targeted to select groups of
shareholders.212
The principal drawback of union-sponsored independent solici
tations is the cost - a full-scale solicitation at a large publicly
traded corporation may cost several million dollars.213 While lower
cost alternatives - such as a targeted solicitation of institutional
investors - are available, they are also less likely to marshal suffi
cient levels of support to pressure corporate management to make
changes.

1.

Floor Proposals: Issues Raised by Rule 14a-6 and Rule 14a-9
What obligation does a company have to disclose union

shareholder proposals of which it is aware before the company files

its definitive proxy materials?

Three often-overlapping federal

proxy rules may govern the disclosures contained in a company's
proxy materials about union proposals - Rules 14a-4,214 14a-6,21s
and 14a-9.216 In this section, we discuss some of the obligations im
posed by Rule 14a-6 and Rule 14a-9.
Rule 14a-6(a) compels a company to file its proxy (or informa
tion) statements solely in definitive form for certain types of solici
tations - the so-called "plain-vanilla" proxy statement.217 A
company may not file a plain-vanilla proxy statement, however, if it
comments on an actual or potential opposing stockholder solicita
tion that would be pursued by means other than a Rule 14a-8 pro
posal included in the registrant's proxy statement.218 Rule 14a-9,
212. See TuoMAs & DIXON, supra note 3, § 6.02.
213. See id. § 21.01 (presenting data on costs of recent proxy solicitations).
214. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (1997).
215. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1997).
216. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1997).
217. The types of solicitations to which Rule 14a-6(a) applies include: "(a) the election of
directors; (b) the election, approval or ratification of accountants; (c) a shareholder proposal
carried in the registrant's proxy statement pursuant to Rule 14a-8; and/or (d) the approval or
ratification of a registrant's executive or director compensation plan, or amendments
thereto." THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 6.03(D).
218. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a). The rule makes it clear that a recommendation by the
registrant's board that stockholders vote against a Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal will not
defeat the exclusion. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) n3. A company's argument on the merits
of a stockholder proposal that is not carried in its proxy statement, however, but instead is
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the antifraud rule in the proxy regulations, requires that the com
pany's disclosures or omissions concerning any shareholder propo
sal not be false or misleading.219
When a company learns of a possible union challenge to be
mounted independently of Rule 14a-8 reasonably well in advance
of its solicitation of proxies for an otherwise routine annual meet
ing, several legal issues are raised. For union-shareholder resolu
tions made outside of Rule 14a-8, the courts have prohibited
companies from filing plain-vanilla proxy materials that do not dis
close the proposals. In Shoen v. AMERC0,220 a federal district
court ruled that a company violated Rules 14a-6 and 14a-9 by at
tempting to avoid the preliminary-filing requirement simply by fail
ing to disclose that a shareholder intended to present a proposal for
a shareholder vote at the annual shareholders' meeting. In that
case, the court granted a preliminary injunction after finding that
the company's failure to describe in its proxy statement three non
Rule 14a-8 proposals, which management was aware would be
raised at the scheduled shareholders' meeting by a shareholder, did
not permit plain-vanilla treatment of this document.221 Even if the
company has properly filed a definitive proxy statement before
learning of a possible union solicitation, it nevertheless may run
afoul of Rule 14a-9 or Rule 14a-4(c) unless it provides stockholders
with reasonable notice of this development through the filing and
distribution of a supplemental proxy statement and form of proxy
that allows stockholders to give voting directions on the new
matter.222
The interplay of Rules 14a-9 and 14a-4 was well-illustrated in a
recent case involving a contested election of directors. In
Chambers v. Briggs & Stratton Corporation, 223 the court granted
the subject of an independent solicitation by the proponent or other person, ordinarily will
bar plain-vanilla treatment. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) n.3.
219. See Fountain v. Avondale Indus., Inc., C.A. No. 95-1198, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5598, at *4-*5 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 1995) (holding that Rule 14a-9 requires that the company
make full and fair disclosure about the proposal if it chooses to comment on it).
220. 885 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Nev. 1994).
221. See 885 F. Supp. at 1346. For further discussion of this case, and its implications for
shareholders under Rule 14a-6 and 14a-9, see THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 6.03(D)
n.80.
222. As we discuss in the next section, shareholder proposals that are presented to a vote
by means other than Rule 14a-8 are subject to the discretionary voting standards of Rule 14a4(c)(l). This rule bars a registrant from using discretionary power to vote against such a
proposal if it has received reasonable notice thereof prior to the solicitation but has failed
nonetheless to seek voting instructions with respect to the proposal. See United Mine Work
ers v. Pittston Co., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'i 94,946 (D.D.C.
Nov. 24, 1989); see also THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 9.0l(E)(3).
223. 863 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
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the plaintiff shareholder's motion for a preliminary injunction, find
ing that the company violated Rule 14a-9 by failing to identify the
plaintiff as a board candidate in its proxy statement, even though he
gave the company advance notice of his candidacy pursuant to the
shareholder-nomination provisions of its by-laws. It ordered the
company to disseminate a supplemental proxy statement identify
ing the plaintiff.224 The company was not required under Rule 14a4, however, to include a reference to the plaintiff's candidacy in its
form of proxy.225
What happens when the union-shareholder proposals are origi
nally submitted under Rule 14a-8, but subsequently the union seeks
to submit them as floor proposals without complying with Rule 14a8? In these circumstances, Rule 14a-6 permits a company to file its
proxy statement solely in definitive form when it omits a Rule 14a-8
union proposal from its proxy statement based on a SEC no-action
letter, even if it plans to vote against the proposal if it is the subject
of an independent solicitation conducted by the union or rule the
proposal out of order if it is introduced from the floor at the stock
holders' meeting.226 The SEC has taken the position, however, that
the company must either make full disclosure in its definitive proxy
statement of its intention to vote against the proposal or forgo the
exercise of discretionary voting authority for that purpose.221
For unions acting as shareholders, these legal principles have
several implications when the unions pursue shareholder resolu
tions outside of Rule 14a-8. First, if the union provides the com
pany with reasonable advance notice of its non-Rule 14a-8 proposal
before the company issues its proxy materials, then the company
must file proxy materials that disclose the union proposal.228 Sec224. See 863 F. Supp. at 906-07.
225. See Chambers v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 883 F. Supp. 374, 376-78 (E.D. Wis. 1995)
(declining to find on cross-motions for summary judgment that Rule 14a-4(b)(2) compelled
inclusion of an opposition candidate's name in the company's form of proxy).
The SEC has also taken the position that a registrant is not required by Item 7 of Sched
ule 14A to include in its proxy statement the names of any nominees other than those for
which the soliciting person is seeking proxy authority. See American Socy. of Corp. Secretar
ies, SEC Interp. Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 265 (Feb. 27, 1996). But the SEC declined
to address a company's Rule 14a-9 obligation, if any, to make such disclosure. See also
THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 6.04(B)(6) n.205.
226. See DIVISION OF CoRP. FIN., SEC, PROXY RULES REFERENCE BooK 37-38 (1980)
[hereinafter PROXY RULES REFERENCE BooK].
227. See id.
228. If the company wishes to exercise discretionary voting authority, it must (1) furnish
some minimum level of disclosure in its proxy statement to fulfill both Rule 14a-9 and 14a-4
requirements; (2) articulate its position on the proposal; and (3) include a separate item in its
form of proxy enabling shareholders to give voting instructions. See United Mine Workers v.
Pittston Co., [1989-1990 'fransfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 94,946 (D.D.C. Nov. 24,
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ond, if the union advises the company of its intention to submit the
proposal at the shareholders' meeting after the company has issued
its definitive proxy materials but reasonably well in advance of the
meeting, then the company may be forced to issue a supplemental
proxy statement and card or forgo the exercise of discretionary vot
ing authority. Finally, if (1) the shareholder proposal is initially
submitted as a Rule 14a-8 proposal, (2) the company obtains a no
action letter permitting it to omit the proposal from the proxy
materials, and (3) the union decides to present the proposal at the
shareholders' meeting, then the company may file a definitive proxy
statement, subject to Rule 14a-4's and Rule 14a-9's restrictions.
Companies will rarely, if ever, be willing to give up their ability to
exercise discretionary voting power, which makes the scope of a
company's obligations under Rule 14a-4 a critical question.

2.

Floor Proposals: Discretionary Voting and Rule 14a-4

Under state law, labor and other shareholders can submit pro
posals for shareholder approval at the annual shareholders' meet
ing, subject to compliance with any applicable bylaw provisions.
When these matters aris� at the meeting, the company's proxy
materials may not have informed shareholders about them, and the
company's proxy agents must rely on the discretionary authority
conferred by the form of proxy in voting on any matter that re
quires shareholder action. Rule 14a-4(c)229 affords some latitude to
the company's proxy agent in this and certain other circumstances
by allowing the exercise of discretionary voting power for desig
nated actions.23o
Rule 14a-4(c)(1) provides companies and other soliciting per
sons some flexibility to cope with the emergence of unanticipated
1989); see also Robert T. Lang et al., Shareholder Initiatives: Proposals and Solicitations, in 4
SECURITIES LAw TECHNIQUES: TRANSACTIONS AND LmGATION § 53.05(3)(b), at 53-151
(A.A. Sommer, Jr. ed., 1997).
229. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c) (1997).
230. This power is limited to the following matters:
(1) Matters which the persons making the solicitation do not know, a reasonable time
before the solicitation, are to be presented at the meeting, if a specific statement to that
effect is made in the proxy statement or form of proxy;
(2) Approval of the minutes of the prior meeting if such approval does not amount to
ratification of the action taken at that meeting;
(3) The election of any person to any office for which a bona fide nominee is named
in the proxy statement and such nominee is unable to serve or for good cause will not
serve[;)
(4) Any proposal omitted from the proxy statement and form of proxy pursuant to
[Rule 14a-8) or [14a-9) of this chapter[; and)
(5) Matters incident to the conduct of the meeting.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c).
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matters that arise shortly before or during the meeting.231 Invoking
this provision requires full disclosure - in either the proxy state
ment or form of proxy - of the proxy holder's intent to exercise
discretionary authority on any such matter.232 However, it "gener
ally denies management the ability to use discretionary voting au
thority with respect to shareholder proposals as to which it had
received adequate notice a reasonable time before the meeting."233
Professor Coffee has argued that the rule should be enforced
strictly.234 If Professor Coffee is correct, then once a company be
comes aware of a non-Rule 14a-8 proposal raised by a union after
the company's proxy cards have been delivered to shareholders, but
within "a reasonable time before the solicitation," it must either (1)
include this matter in a revised proxy card and disseminate it to
shareholders with accompanying explanatory soliciting material,
thus giving shareholders a meaningful opportunity to revoke any
previously executed proxy granting discretionary authority;23s or
(2) if the matter is not so included in the card, forgo entirely the
exercise of discretionary power on the matter.236
231. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 1823, 1938 SEC
LEXIS 678, at *3-*4 (Aug. 11, 1938). Discretionary authority is permitted to be exercised
under (c}(l) only with respect to proposals initiated by persons other than the proxy holder.
See Proxy Rules - Comprehensive Review, Exchange Act Release No. 23,789, [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'JI 84,044, at 88,331 (Nov. 10, 1986). Some years
earlier, the SEC's Division of Corporation Fmance took the position that a registrant's board
may not rely on this provision to act on any registrant-proposed matter other than those
incidental to the conduct of the meeting. See PROXY RuLES REFERENCE BooK, supra note
226, at 36.
232. See 17 C.F.R

§ 240.14a-4(c}(l).

233. Coffee, supra note 177.
234. See id.
235. See United Mine Workers v. Pittston Co., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 'l! 94,946 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1989); PRoXY RULES REFERENCE BooK, supra note
226, at 35. The Division of Corporation Fmance has indicated that previously granted prox
ies need not be invalidated where the new proxies are circulated to permit revocation of such
proxies in accordance with applicable state law. Thus, any old proxies not superseded by
later-dated proxies may be tabulated. See PRoXY RULES REFERENCE BooK, supra note 226,
at 35-36; see also Larkin v. Baltimore Bancorp, 769 F. Supp. 919, 927 (D. Md. 1991} (ac
cepting as sufficient, for purposes of Rule 14a-4(c)(1), management's circulation of new cards
providing the opportunity to revoke previously granted discretionary authority in light of
last-minute dissident solicitation and describing this as "the 'authority is effective until re
voked' " approach, rather than requiring the invalidation of all proxies already given to man
agement}, affd., 948 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1991).
236. See PROXY RULES REFERENCE BooK, supra note 226, at 35; see also Pittston Co.,
[1989-1990 'fransfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,273 (rejecting defendant Pittston's
argument that it could not make the "specific statement" in its proxy statement or form of
proxy contemplated by Rule 14a-4(c)(l}, because it had not yet received "the actual text of
[the union's] proposals" and therefore could not furnish the text thereof to shareholders in its
proxy statement).
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For the union-shareholder proponent, the question of whether it
has provided adequate notice of a previously unknown agenda item
to the registrant within "a reasonable time before the solicitation,"
and thereby has precluded the exercise of discretionary authority
under Rule 14a-4(c)(l) pursuant to earlier-dated proxies, will tum
on the facts and circumstances of a particular solicitation. In the
leading case, United Mine Workers ofAmerica v. Pittston Co.,237 the
court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff union. In
its opinion, the court found that the company had received notice of
the union's intent to present four resolutions at the annual meeting
prior to delivering its proxy statement to shareholders by mail but
that the company did not see the actual text of the resolutions and
supporting statements until after the mailing.238 While Pittston's
proxy statement noted the substance of the resolutions and an
nounced the company's plan to vote discretionary authority against
the resolutions were they to be presented properly at the meeting,
the company's card did not afford shareholders an opportunity to
vote on any of them.239
Meanwhile, the plaintiff union obtained a temporary restraining
order forcing the company to mail the union's own soliciting mater
ials, including a form of proxy that contained a mechanism for
shareholders to vote on its resolutions as well as management's un
contested board slate and request for auditor ratification.240 En
closed in Pittston's mailing of the union's materials, effected
twenty-six days before the meeting, was a company card that omit
ted these resolutions, even though the existence of the resolutions
- albeit not their substance or text - and the company's opposi
tion were noted in an accompanying letter from the company.241

A

subsequent follow-up letter from the company to shareholders like
wise failed to rectify this omission. The district court denied the
union's motion to enjoin the meeting, however, on the ground that
the company's intent to exercise discretionary authority violated
the

proxy

rules,

thus

allowing

the

meeting

to

proceed

as

scheduled.242
237. [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'JI 94,946 (D.D.C. Nov. 24,
1989).
238. See [1989-1990 'fransfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95;273.
239. See [1989-1990 'fransfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95;267.
240. See [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95;267.
241. See [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,267-68.
242. See [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95;268.
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Several weeks after the court rendered its decision, the SEC
staff warned in a letter to Pittston that such exercise had violated
Rule 14a-4, and the SEC asked the company to indicate what re
sponsive action it intended to take.243 The court reached a similar
conclusion, holding that "Pittston was capable of providing share
holders with a new proxy card that would allow voters to vote on
each [union] resolution as they saw fit rather than to grant blanket
discretionary authority to the Company."244
The SEC recently suggested, however, that management does
not always need to include a shareholder floor proposal on the
company's ballot in order to exercise discretionary voting authority.
A recent SEC no-action letter has been interpreted "by some prac
titioners to imply that discretionary voting authority can still be uti
lized by management, when management informs the shareholders
how it intends to vote and the insurgent does not solicit a majority
of the shareholders."245 In a no-action letter to Idaho Power Com
pany the SEC staff examined that company's obligation to carry on
its proxy card a non-Rule 14a-8 proposal.246 It conditioned the
company's obligation to carry the matter on its proxy card upon the
proponent's "deliver[y of] a proxy statement and form of proxy to
holders of a majority of shares entitled to vote on the matter or, if a
greater percentage is required under applicable law to carry the
proposal, holders of the minimum required."247 The SEC con
cluded that, under these conditions, if the registrant either has been
given adequate prior notice of the proponent's intent to solicit
proxies pursuant to an advance notice bylaw or, absent such a by
law, within a reasonable time before the shareholders' meeting,
243. See [1989-1990 'll"ansfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,268.
[1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,273.
245. Coffee, supra note 177, at 7 (citing Idaho Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996
WL 114545 (Mar. 13, 1996)).
246. See Idaho Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 114545, at *8-*9 (Mar. 13,
1996).
247. Idaho Power Co., 1996 WL 114545, at *9. Thus, a proponent who is conducting a
targeted non-exempt solicitation of less than a majority of the registrant's shareholders or an
exempt solicitation of 10 or fewer shareholders under Rule 14a-2(b)(2), or who is engaging in
an exempt solicitation under Rule 14a-2(b)(l), will not be able to invoke Rule 14a-4(c)(l) as
a basis for "piggy-backing" on the registrant's card.
Furthermore, the Idaho Power no-action letter does not appear to require the company to
make full disclosure about the union proposal - as contrasted with the disclosure necessary
to preserve discretionary authority under Rule 14a-4(c)(l) - unless the union is circulating
its own proxy statement and card to stockholders holding a majority of the shares entitled to
vote on the matter. If the company claims that the union has not made the necessary solicita
tion when the company files its proxy statement, then the company could include only mini
mal disclosures in the proxy statement about the "nature of the proposal," see 1996 WL
114545, at *9, and later "cure" any defect in the initial proxy materials by making a supple
mental filing. The company may believe that it gains a tactical advantage by doing so.
244.

Michigan Law Review

1070

[Vol. 96:1018

then the proposal must be carried on the registrant's form of
proxy.24s
Companies may prefer to recirculate a card bearing the new
matter to enable shareholders to express their views without having
to execute the union's form of proxy. Pope & Talbot employed this
tactic in the

1996 proxy season.249

Any unrevoked proxy returned

prior to recirculation therefore may be voted against the matter
pursuant to discretionary authority.250 In the event the union, for
strategic or other purposes, does not notify the company of its pro
posal in advance of the printing or mailing of the definitive proxy
statement and card, the company must file and deliver a supple
mental proxy piece and new card giving shareholders the opportu248. In a recent speech, SEC Commissioner Steven M.H. Wallman advocated the amend
ment of Rule 14a-4(c)(l) to permit companies to vote discretionary authority against Idaho
Power-style "late resolutions" - shareholder proposals that are not presented under Rule
14a-8, without having to carry such dissident proposals on their cards, so long as there is
sufficient proxy-statement disclosure of the proposal and the intended use of discretionary
authority. See Steven M.H. Wallman, Reflections on Shareholder Proposals: Correcting the
Past; Thinking of the Future, in 2 PREPARATION OF ANNuAL D1sCLosuRE Doct.JMENTS 419,
431-32 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-970, 1997) (remarks to the
Council of Institutional Investors in Chicago, Illinois, Oct. 8, 1996). This suggestion was part
of a broader model for reform of Rule 14a-8. See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.
A similar proposal has been formally issued for notice and comment by the full Commis
sion. FJrst, the SEC has proposed to amend Rule 14a-4(c)(l) to substitute the "reasonable
time" standard with a clear date after which notice will be deemed inadequate. The revised
provision would allow a company voting discretion if it did not receive notice of a potential
solicitation at least 45 days prior to the date the company first mailed its proxy materials to
shareholders for the prior year's annual meeting. See SEC Proposals, supra note 150, at *21.
Because shareholders typically would not have access to information setting the company's
mailing date for the prior year's annual meeting, the SEC also proposes to change Rule 14a5(e) to require that companies disclose in their proxy materials the date by which notice must
be received. See id. at *24. Bylaw provisions authorized by state law that fix a different
definition of advance notice would override the notice requirement in Rule 14a-4(c)(l). See
id. at *21.
Second, the SEC has proposed a new paragraph, 14a-4(c)(2), to address the circumstances
under which a company receiving adequate notice of a non-Rule 14a-8 proposal may exercise
its discretionary voting authority. In order to exercise such authority, the company's proxy
materials must include "a discussion of the nature of the matters and how the company in
tends to exercise its discretion on each matter" in the proxy statement, and "a cross-reference
to the discussion in the proxy statement and a box allowing shareholders to withhold discre
tionary authority from management to vote on the same matter(s)" on the proxy card. Id. at
*22. Companies would still have the obligation imposed by Rule 14a-9 to provide sharehold
ers with sufficient information to make informed voting decisions and to provide a meaning
ful opportunity to review information. See id. These materials would have to be filed in their
preliminary form and be subject to staff review. Thus, the SEC would no longer allow com
panies to file proxy materials in definitive form despite prior notification, even if the materi
als disclose the nature of the proposal and how the company intends to exercise its
discretionary authority. See id.
These proposals are the subject of public comment at the time of this writing.
249. See Pope & Talbot, Definitive Additional Materials (Apr. 12, 1996),
EDGAR, Film No. 96,546,521.
250.

See PROXY RULES REFERENCE BooK, supra note 226, at 35-36.
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nity to revoke previously cast proxies if the union solicits holders of
more than a majority of the company's stock.251
A company can only use Rule 14a-4(c)(4) as the basis for exer
cising discretionary authority for "[a]ny proposal omitted from the
proxy statement and form of proxy pursuant to [Rules 14a-8 or 14a9]."252 If a shareholder proposal is initially submitted to the com
pany under Rule 14a-8 and the SEC issues a no-action letter, then
the company may omit the proposal from its proxy materials.253 If
the company intends to exercise discretionary authority to vote on
the excluded proposal if it is subsequently presented by the union
on the floor at the meeting, however, then the SEC has taken the
position that the company must have disclosed fully in its proxy
statement the possibility that the excluded shareholder proposal
might be raised at the meeting and that, in such event, the proxy
will be voted in the discretion of the holder in order to exercise
discretionary authority under this rule.254
251. A pending federal action brought by UNITE raises the question of when a company
follow this procedure. The complaint alleges that the company was given notice of the
shareholder's proposal "reasonably in advance" of the annual meeting and before mailing its
proxy materials and was told that the union intended to solicit at least a majority of the
company's outstanding shares. See Complaint, UNITE v. The May Dept Stores Co., 97 Civ.
2120 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 30, 1997). The company and the union dispute the outcome of the
vote on the proposal. See May, Union Dispute a Shareholders' Vote on Poison Pill Plan,
WALL ST. J., May 27, 1997, at A6.
252. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-4(c)(4) (1997).
253. See Grimes v. Ohio Edison Co., 992 F.2d 455, 456 (2d Cir. 1993); Grimes v. Center
ior Energy Corp., 909 F.2d 529, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
254. See Pacific Enters., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286196 (Nov. 9, 1990); Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 140, at 1968 n.124 (suggesting that Rule 14a-4(c)(5) is the basis for
exercising discretionary authority in this situation); PRoxv RULES REFERENCE BooK, supra
note 226, at 37-38; see also Lang et al., supra note 228, § 53.05(3), at 53-144 n.140 (citing the
example of Consolidated Freightways's decision to include in its 1994 proxy statement disclo
sure of shareholder proposals despite the Division of Corporation Fmance's grant of Rule
14a-8 no-action relief). The registrant's obligation to furnish this disclosure "does not de
pend on whether the security holder has advised the issuer of his intention to raise the matter
at the meeting notwithstanding its exclusion from the proxy statement" PROXY RuLES REF
ERENCE BooK, supra note 226, at 38.
1\vo courts of appeal have ruled that a shareholder proposal properly excluded from a
registrant proxy statement under Rule 14a-8(c)(7) - the so-called "ordinary business" exclu
sion, discussed in more detail in supra section III.A.2.b - need not be disclosed therein for
Rule 14a-9 purposes, despite the proponent's stated intention to present the excluded propo
sal at the shareholders' meeting. See Ohio Edison Co., 992 F.2d at 458; Centerior Energy
Corp., 909 F.2d at 533. Neither decision specifically addressed the Rule 14a-4 discretionary
authority question.
For a more detailed discussion of the circumstances in which discretionary proxy voting
authority may be exercised by registrants within the parameters of Rule 14a-4 and state law
- whether with respect to a shareholder proposal omitted from a registrant's proxy state
ment in reliance upon the staff Rule 14a-8 no-action process, or any other matter of which
the registrant has received reasonable notice in advance of the shareholders' meeting or
other date of shareholder action, in the case of consents or authorizations - see THOMAS &
DIXON, supra note 3, §§ 9.0l(E)(3), 15.05.
can
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From the union shareholder's perspective, the company's ability
to exercise discretionary authority will tum on whether a share
holder proposal has been presented under Rule 14a-8. Thus, in the
Pittston case, the plaintiff union's resolutions had never been sub
mitted for inclusion in the company's proxy statement under Rule
14a-8 and thus could not be deemed excluded or excludable pursu
ant to any of the bases enumerated in Rule 14a-8(c).255 The court
found irrelevant the fact that such proposals could have been
presented via Rule 14a-8.256
The end result of this analysis is that a union can advise the
company in advance of its intent to present a proposal at the meet
ing without invoking Rule 14a-8, thereby blocking the company's
ability to use discretionary authority under Rule 14a-4(c)(4) to vote
proxies against the proposal. The company must tum to Rule 14a4(c)(l) in order to exercise discretionary authority, which requires
it to carry the proposal on its card and provide sufficient notice to
the shareholders of the proposal in its proxy statement, provided
the shareholder satisfies the conditions imposed by the Idaho Power
no-action letter.257

D.

"Just Vote No" Campaigns

In "Just Vote No" campaigns, shareholders withhold approval
from the company's unopposed board slate at the annual election of
directors to pressure management to improve its performance.258
Although these campaigns have largely symbolic value, the nega
tive publicity generated may provide a strong impetus for govern
ance-related changes. 259

Unions and other institutional

shareholders have actively participated in these campaigns, spot255. See United Mine Workers v. Pittston Co., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 'J[ 94,946, at 95;2.71-72 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1989).
256. See Pittston Co., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,27195,272.
257. But cf. Wallman, supra note 248, at 431-32 (criticizing this practice).
258. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing With
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1993).
259. See Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders, Exchange Act Release
No. 30,849, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'J[ 85,002, at 82,838 (June 24,
1992) (recognizing increasing shareholder use of this tactic to communicate with corporate
management, and proposing enhanced disclosure of proxy voting results, including the
number of votes withheld from each board candidate, in the next quarterly report on Form
10-Q or Form 10-K). This new disclosure requirement was adopted in October 1992. See
THOMAS & DxxoN, supra note 3, § 6.04(B)(19) n.334; see also Lang et al., supra note 228,
§§ 53.02(l)(b)(ii) & (vi) (finding that announcements of voting intent can influence the votes
of other shareholders); John Pound, The Rise ofthe Political Model of Corporate Governance
and Corporate Contro� 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1052 & n.194 (1993).
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lighting certain companies and selected issues sqch as executive
compensation.
For example, shareholders of the Walt Disney Company re
cently used a "Just Vote No" campaign to protest that company's
"multimillion dollar payout to former President Michael Ovitz and
a rich new contract for Chairman and Chief Executive Michael
Eisner." 260 Institutional and individual shareholders withheld thir
teen percent of the votes cast for the five company directors that
were up for reelection at the meeting, while eight percent of the
shareholders voted against Eisner's new contract. 261
In 1995, shareholder "Just Vote No" campaigns garnered sub
stantial support. At the Archer Daniel Midlands 1995 annual meet
ing, nearly twenty percent of the votes cast opposed management's
slate of directors. 26 2 Shareholders at W.R. Grace & Company's
1995 annual meeting withheld nineteen percent of the votes cast for
the reelection of four directors. 263
Unions can participate in these campaigns without triggering the
federal proxy rules solicitation provisions if the unions are careful
to stay within the terms of certain safe harbors. Rule 14a-1(l)(2)(iv)
provides that published or broadcast announcements by union and
other stockholders, who otherwise are not soliciting proxies, of how
they plan to vote on any matter submitted for stockholder approval
are exempted from the definition of solicitation. 264 This regulatory
safe harbor extends to a union shareholder's announced reasons for
its decision to vote, abstain, or withhold proxies.
A second prong of the safe harbor protects a union pension
fund that communicates its voting intentions to its beneficiaries or
260. Bruce Orwall, Disney Holders Decry Payouts at Meeting, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1997,
at A3.
261. See id. An additional 3.2% abstained from voting.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(l)(2)(iv) (1997). Rule 14a-l(l)(2)(iv) provides that the
terms "solicit" and "solicitation" do not apply to:
A communication by a security holder who does not otherwise engage in a proxy
solicitation (other than a solicitation exempt under § 240.14a-2) stating how the security
holder intends to vote and the reasons therefor, provided that the communication:
(A) Is made by means of speeches in public forums, press releases, published or
broadcast opinions, statements, or advertisements appearing in a broadcast media, or
newspaper, magazine or other bona fide publication disseminated on a regular basis,
(B) Is directed to persons to whom the security holder owes a fiduciary duty in con
nection with the voting of securities of the registrant held by the security holder, or
(C) Is made in response to unsolicited requests for additional information with re
spect to a prior communication by the security holder made pursuant to this paragraph
(l)(2)(iv).
17 C.F.R. 14a-l(l)(2)(iv).
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other persons to whom it owes a fiduciary duty in connection with
the voting of portfolio securities.265 Written or oral reiterations of a
public announcement previously made under the safe harbor are
covered also, but only if responsive to unsolicited requests for infor
mation with respect to the earlier exempt announcement. An un
limited number of

exempt statements relating

to

a specific

solicitation may be made, provided that proxy authority is not being
sought.
We suspect that labor unions have been heavily involved in
these "Just Vote No" campaigns, either by supporting other share
holders' initiatives or by initiating them. These voting initiatives
typically take place at companies where executive compensation
levels are sufficiently high to concern other shareholders. Labor's
interest in these battles could be twofold: to protect the value of its
capital investment from management self-enrichment and to point
out the inequities of management's negotiating position in negotiat
ing compensation for rank-and-file workers.

N.

CHECKS ON LABOR-SHAREHOLDERS'
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Labor unions often face a potential conflict of interest when
they act as shareholders. On the one hand, they could be attempt
ing to increase firm value in order to maximize their residual share
as shareholders. On the other hand, they could be sacrificing their
shareholder value in order to protect jobs or otherwise help their
members.
In some situations, no apparent conflict exists between unions'
dual roles. For example, some companies whose stock is held by
union pension funds have no unionized workers or ongoing or pro
spective unionization campaigns. At other companies, labor unions
and management may have a reasonably harmonious relationship,
so that labor does not need to protect worker interests at the ex
pense of other shareholders. Under these circumstances, when la
bor groups are initiating corporate-governance reform measures or
other voting initiatives, labor is more likely to be acting as monitors
of corporate management seeking to reduce the agency costs of
equity.
In other cases, a conflict of interest clearly exists. Workers and
management may have bitter historical relationships, or there may
be ongoing or anticipated disputes over critical worker issues. In
265. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l{l){2){iv).
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fact, as we have discussed above, labor has targeted some of its
shareholder initiatives at companies where it is concurrently en
gaged in collective bargaining negotiations or union organizing
campaigns. In these circumstances, corporate management and
other shareholders may suspect- that union-shareholder activism is
just another form of leverage in labor negotiations.
Despite the potential conflict of interest, powerful forces con
strain potential labor-shareholder opportunism and limit the con
flicts that arise between labor qua shareholder and labor qua union.
In this section, we examine three sets of legal and market forces
that act as checks on opportunistic union shareholder conduct: (1)
the fiduciary obligations of pension fund trustees; (2) labor's need
to persuade other shareholders to vote for its shareholder initia
tives; and (3) the capital market, the market for corporate control,
and international product competition.
A.

Fiduciary and Other Checks on Taft-Hartley Pension Funds

At the outset, it may be useful to clarify the meaning of the term
Pension funds can be divided broadly into
public- and private-sector funds. Some of the largest and most ac
tive institutional investors today are the public pension funds, with
CalPERS being the paradigm activist investor.266 Even though
public-sector unions sometimes influence these public-employee
pension plans, public-employee pension funds are not generally
considered to be union pension funds.
Private-sector employees have two main types of pension plans.
Most plans are corporate pension plans, whereby the corporation
appoints the plan trustees who run the plan. Typically the trustees
are officers of the corporation. Many of these corporate plans arise
from collective bargaining negotiations, but the union's only role is
to bargain over the level of contribution or benefits.267 The union
has no formal control over the plans. Again, these are not generally
considered union pension funds.
Union pension funds are the other main type of private pension
plans. Their structure is mandated by section 302 of the Taftunion pension fund.

266. Other public pension funds rarely engage in shareholder activism. Pension funds for
federal government workers, for example, are required to invest in federal government se
curities, see AFL-CIO, lNvEsTMENT OF UNION PENSION FUNDS 19 (1981), and thus are un
concerned with private-sector corporate governance.
267. It has been estimated that up to two-thirds of all private pension funds involve col
lective bargaining. See id. at 20 tbl.l. The General Motors pension fund is an example of a
corporate fund that comes from collective bargaining.
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Hartley Act,268 and so they are often referred to as "Taft-Hartley"
plans. The Taft-Hartley Act forbids employers from making pay
ments of any kind to a union,269 including union-run pension
funds,210 but makes an exception for pension funds that have equal
numbers of trustees appointed by management and the union and
meet certain other requirements.211 Perhaps forty percent of all
collectively bargained plans are joint trustee plans.212 The Depart
ment of Labor estimated that in 1992 there were 3,109 Taft-Hartley
pension funds that collectively held approximately $215 billion.213
Sometimes they are called multi-employer pension plans, because
most jointly managed Taft-Hartley plans involve a dominant union
with many employers. The Teamsters Central States Pension Fund
is a prominent example.
The critical question here is the extent to which union pension
funds are legally constrained from using their shareholder voting
power to further goals other than maximizing their investment re

turn. The securities laws, especially Rule 14a-8, address limits on
what subjects unions can raise on the corporate ballot in ways we
have analyzed above. Pension law and the Taft-Hartley Act have
said little about the issue, but the broader issue of where union pen
sion funds can invest their funds has been the subject of considera
ble litigation and commentary.
The most important check on investment abuses by union pen
sion funds, at least in theory, was the joint union-management con268. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1994).
269. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2).
270. The Taft-Hartley Act allows unions to control directly a small number of pension
plans, but these are of minor importance. They include a few grandfathered plans in exist
ence before 1946 to which employers had made contributions. They also include plans
funded by the union for the pensions of its own officers and employees, such as the employ
ees' pension plan and trust of the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine
Workers. They also can include pension plans for workers funded solely through worker
contributions. See Richard Blodgett, Union Pension Fund Asset Management, in ABUSE ON
WALL STREET: CONFLICTS OF IN:raREST IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS 320, 327-28 (1980).
While these directly controlled plans deserve the title of "union pension funds," that term is
generally reserved for the joint union-management plans discussed in the text.
271. See 29 U.S.C. § 186. In addition to jointly managed boards, the Taft-Hartley Act
requires that (1) the funds be held in trust for the sole benefit of the employees and their
families and dependents; (2) a written agreement that specifies the basis on which the em
ployer will make payments; (3) an impartial umpire who can break deadlocks in the board,
appointed by a federal district court if the parties cannot agree on an umpire; (4) an annual
audit; and (5) limitation of the trust to certain purposes, such as pensions, health or life
insurance, apprenticeship training, vacation or holiday funds, day care centers, scholarships,
and legal services. See 29 u.s.c. § 186(c); see also NOEL ARNOLD LEVIN, GUIDELINES FOR
FIDUCIARIES OF TAFT-HARTLEY TRUSTS: AN ERISA MANuAL 3 (1980).
272. See AFL-CIO, supra note 266, at 20 tbl.1.
273. See Sweeney, supra note 2, at 2.
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trol of the trustees. The Taft-Hartley Act specifically aimed to
prevent unions from using the pension funds as a "war chest," as
the United Mine Workers in particular was thought to have done
with its pension plans prior to 1947.274
Despite the balanced board membership, unions have tended to
dominate these jointly managed funds. Indeed, it is "[o]ften . . .
very difficult to distinguish between the pension fund and the
union."275 One reason is that the union pension funds have typi
cally been funded through fixed contributions by the employer with
the trustees of the fund setting the pension levels.276 Whether the
pension does well or poorly on its investment of such funds does
not impact the employer directly.

By contrast, in corporate

defined-benefit funds, employers directly benefit from good invest
ment performance, because they can put less money in for a given
level of defined benefits. Because of the reduced incentives, man
agement often has left the investment decisions to the union
trustees.
The Taft-Hartley Act also imposes a fiduciary duty on plan
trustees, mandating that all payments be held in trust for the "sole
and exclusive benefit of the employees . . . and their families and
dependents" and insisting that "the funds held therein cannot be
used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or annui
ties. "277 The Taft-Hartley Act did not directly regulate where the
pension fund could place its investments, however, and there are
many anecdotes of union pension funds making bad or corrupt in
vestments, although fiduciary-duty lawsuits sporadically policed
abuses.278
Perhaps of greater bite than the Taft-Hartley duties are the
more recent fiduciary duties imposed by BRISA on all private
pension-fund trustees, whether corporate or jointly managed.279
BRISA holds trustees to a prudent-person standard and requires
274. See Blodgett, supra note 270, at 330 (noting Senator Taft's concern that the adminis
tration of the UMW pension and welfare fund was so unrestricted that "practically the fund
became a war chest for the union").
275. Id. at 321.
276. See id. at 322-23.
277. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1994).
278. In the well-known case of Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971),
the court found a breach of the trustees' common law fiduciary duty when the United Mine
Workers pension fund, on instructions of John L. Lewis, purchased shares in various utility
companies to try to influence them to purchase union-mined coal.
279. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1461;
Blodgett, supra note 270, at 323.
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diversified investments.280 In addition, it makes each trustee indi
vidually liable for breaches of fiduciary duty,281 a threat that may
have encouraged greater involvement by the management trustees
on the joint board.
Union pension funds have reacted in various ways to the ten
sions of becoming major capitalist investors in the stock market.
Some union pension funds historically shunned the stock market
entirely, investing only in bonds. Others had a policy against in
vesting in nonunion companies.282 One 1978 study showed that a
sample of seventy-five union pension funds invested half as much as
employer-controlled plans in fifteen predominately nonunion com
panies.283 The economist Richard Freeman, writing in the early
1980s,. emphasized that the policy of noninvestment costs union
pension funds the inside shareholder pressure they might have were
they to invest in nonunion companies.284 More recently, union pen
sion funds have even made international investments.285
Pension funds increasingly are indexing their investments to
track the general return of the stock market.286 This passive strat
egy of investment makes pension funds less able to target their in
vestments. Union pension funds appear to be less indexed than
other pension funds, however, perhaps so that they can make more
targeted use of investments.287
Indeed, a central issue for BRISA regulation of union pension
funds involves their targeted social investments of one kind or an
other, such as providing housing loans for union members or invest
ing in construction projects that employ union labor.288 Much
280. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(B), (C).
281. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1105(c)(2)(B).
282. This policy of investing in unionized companies was popularized in RIFKIN &
BARBER, supra note 1.
283. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN, UNIONS, PENSIONS, AND UNION PENSION FUNDS 44
(National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 1226, 1983).
284. See id. at 46.
285. See Paul G. Barr, Teamsters Fund Invests One-Third ofAssets Overseas, PENSIONS &
INvEsTMENrs, Feb. 3, 1997, at l.
286. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WoU<, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW
739 (2d ed. 1995) ("[T]he growth of passive investing from its inception in the early 1970s to
its central role in modem practice has been the dominant event in the period since the enact
ment of BRISA."); Romano, supra note 77, at 833 (noting that large funds increased portfo
lio indexing beginning in the late 1980s).
287. Union pension funds are often asked "to screen and actively target or exclude cer
tain types of investments as a means of advancing the multiple and long-term economic and
social objectives of plan participants." Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO Sup·
ports Strong Pension Protections, Activist Investing, LABOR & INvESTMENTS, Fourth Quarter
1993, at 3.
288. See Simon, supra note 88, at 268.
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litigation289 and debate290 has ensued over whether such invest
ments are consistent with BRISA fiduciary duties. The Depart
ment of Labor more or less consistently has advocated an "other
things equal" test, in which pension funds can make investments
that benefit unions or workers if the risk-adjusted return matches
other investments.291 The latest incarnation of social investing in
volves "economically targeted investments," the subject of a 1994
interpretative bulletin of the Department of Labor that arguably
encourages such investments.292 The debate over social investing293
or economically targeted investments294 by union pension funds is
beyond the scope of this article. The safest conclusion is that,
289. See, e.g., Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1986). The pension fund in Brock
encountered difficulties when Florida real estate prices fell in the late 1980s. See Joel
Chernoff, Ego Leads to Dennis Walton's Down/al� PENSIONS & INvEsrMENTS, July 8, 1991, at
1.
A number of other cases have discussed the compatibility of social investments and
BRISA. See, e.g., Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(upholding Teachers' Retirement System bailout of New York City by buying $860 million of
highly risky bonds), affd. mem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979); B,o ard of 'Ii"ustees v. Mayor of
Baltimore City, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989) (upholding South African divestiture); Regents of
the Univ. of Mich. v. State, 419 N.W.2d 773 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a state law
requiring South African divestiture violated the Michigan Constitution).
290. See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, Arguments in Favor ofFiduciary Divestment of "South Afri
can" Securities, 65 NEB. L. REv. 209 (1986); James D. Hutchinson & Charles G. Cole, Legal
Standards Governing Investment ofPensions Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA.
L. REv. 1340 (1980); Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Socially Responsible" Investment: Doing Good
Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1992); John H. Langbein,
Social Investing of Pension Funds and University Endowments: Unprincipled, Futile, and Ille
ga� in DISINVESTMENT, Is rr LEGAL? Is rr MoRAL? Is rr PRODUCTIVE? 1 (National Legal
Ctr. for the Public Interest ed., 1985); John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Invest
ing and the Law of Trusts, 19 MICH. L. REv. 72 (1980); Ian D. Lanoff, The Social Investment
of Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done Lawfully under ERISA?, 31 LAB. L.J. 387
(1980).
291. See John Godfrey, Pmdent Pension Trustee May Use Social Goals to Pick Invest
ments, Reich Says, 63 TAX NoTES 1745 (1994) (" 'The Department of Labor does not condone
the use of pension funds [in a way that subordinates financial return to some other social
objective]. We prohibit it' If, however, risk and return are not sacrificed, a trustee may
choose to invest money with the intention of promoting a social objective." (quoting the
testimony of Robert L. Reich, Secretary of Labor, before the Joint Economic Committee
(June 22, 1994))).
292. See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard under BRISA in Con
sidering Economically Targeted Investments, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (1997).
293. See, e.g., lirrLEL GRAY, NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE INvEsrMENT AND CoNTROL OF
PENSION FUNDS (1983); NOEL ARNOLD LEVIN & MARK E. BROSSMAN, SOCIAL lNvEsTING
FOR PENSION FUNDs (1982); SoCIAL lNvEsTING (Dan M. McGill ed., 1984); Lanoff, supra
note 290, at 389 (arguing that employment benefits to working beneficiaries is not a legiti
mate concern of trustees, at least if it requires a reduction in the fund's rate of return).
294. Compare Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Protecting Retirees While Encouraging Econom
ically Targeted Investments, 5 KAN. J .L. & Pus. PoLY. 47 (1996) (arguing that the Depart
ment of Labor appropriately continues the "all things equal" test for investing in ETis) with
Edward A. Zelinsky, ET[, Phone the Department of Labor: Economically Targeted Invest
ments, IB 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 BERKELEY J . EMP. & LAB. L.
333 (1995) (arguing that the new bulletin improperly diverges from prior policy).
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within bounds, BRISA - and certainly Taft-Hartley - allows
union pension funds to invest in projects that benefit workers, so
long as the risk and return is similar to other projects.
While union pension funds long have worried about where their
money is invested, until recently they have paid relatively little at
tention to their voting power as shareholders. For example, a sur
vey of union pension fund directors published by the

AFL-CIO

in

1981 found little awareness of the potential power of shareholder
votes.295 Some commentators have attributed pension funds' pas
sivity to the tight fiduciary duties of BRISA. Writing in 1990, Pro
fessor Black noted in an influential article that the Department of
Labor "had been silent on the basic question of whether an BRISA
fiduciary can ever spend plan money to promote a shareholder pro
posal," and suggested that no BRISA fiduciary had ever done so.296
While a few union pension plans had made proposals by 1990,297
Black's statement reflects the general spirit that shareholder activ
ism was beyond the scope of union and other BRISA-regulated
pension funds.
The voting passivity of the 1980s clearly changed in the 1990s.
In 1991, the

AFL-CIO

issued model proxy-voting and investment

guidelines in which it encouraged its members to push more activist
agendas.298 This was followed in 1992 by the Industrial Union De
partment of the AFL-CIO passing a resolution urging "workers and
their representatives to take a more active role in the governance of
their corporations and in responsible investing and proxy voting by
pension plans."299 A similar resolution called for the use of "coor
dinated campaigns in demanding corporate responsibility."30o
295. See AFL-CIO, supra note 266, at 42 ("The proposition that the rights associated with
ownership might be used to directly influence corporate behavior was by and large a new
idea to those surveyed.").
296. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 554-55
(1990). Black noted that the Department of Labor has required pension plans to vote their
shares but has not encouraged plans to make their own proposals. See id. at 554.
297. See Ethan G. Stone, Note, Must We Teach Abstinence?: Pensions' Relationship In
vestments and the Lessons ofFiduciary Duty, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 2222, 2242 (1994) (challeng

ing Black's passivity claim by noting that pension plans associated with the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters were prominent shareholder activists of the late 1980s and spon
sored many proposals).

298. See Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Pensions, Proxies and Power: Recent Developments in
the Use ofProxy Voting to Influence Corporate Governance, 7 LAB. LAW. 771, 773-75 (1991).
299. Patrick S. McGum, Growth of Union Activism Is Byproduct of the 1980s, CORP.
GOVERNANCE BuLL., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 5, 6 (quoting resolutions from the IUD's Constitu
tional Convention in 1992).
300. Id.
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Department of Labor's issuance of proxy voting

guidelines further encouraged the rise in labor shareholder activ
ism.301 In a 1994 interpretative bulletin, the Department of Labor
advocated a corporate-activist role for private pension funds.302 In
vestors were urged to monitor or influence corporate management
when such activities would be likely to enhance the value of invest
ments.303 The Department of Labor suggested issues to raise in
shareholder proposals, including the independence and expertise of
candidates for boards of directors, executive compensation, the na
ture of long-term business plans, and corporate policies regarding
mergers and acquisitions.304 While the directive is imprecise about
whether union-fund trustees can sacrifice investment returns for
other goals,305 the general spirit is to allow union pension funds to
flex their power somewhat.
In short, BRISA does impose some limits on how far union pen
sion funds can push shareholder resolutions. Cost-justified expend
itures on resolutions dealing With corporate-governance issues are
allowable. But union pension funds risk BRISA litigation when
they sponsor resolutions that clearly can be shown to provide low
returns.

BRISA,

of course, only applies to the pension funds, not to the

unions themselves. Unions can purchase stock and propose resolu
tions without breaching
dom from

BRISA

BRISA

fiduciary duties. While the free

constraints may push toward direct union

shareholder activity, such actions may be less likely to succeed than
actions by a union pension fund. Other shareholders may be suspi
cious of a union-shareholder proposal when the union spends far
more on the proposal than it could ever hope to recoup in invest
ment return. Recall that Albertson's management urged this cost
benefit calculus as a reason other shareholders should defeat a
union proposal that related ostensibly purely to corporate govern
ance:306 it could be a (union) wolf in (shareholder) sheep's cloth
ing.

A

pension fund sponsoring a corporate-governance proposal

301. See Patricia B. Limbacher, DOL Peeking over Proxy Shoulders, PENSIONS & !Nv:EsT
Mar. 6, 1995, at 1; Patrick S. McGurn, DOL Issues New Guidelines on Proxy Voting,
Active Investing, CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL., July-Aug. 1994, at 1.
302. See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (1997).
MENTS,

303. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(3).
304. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2.
305. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(2).
306. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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that could potentially earn it substantial shareholder profits may
arouse less suspicion from other investors.
B.

Labor Needs Other Shareholders' Support for Their Voting
Initiatives to Succeed

Most labor voting initiatives cannot succeed without the support
of other shareholders.307 This is most apparent in situations in
which labor is trying to force the board of directors to take action,
such as in the Fleming Companies case, in which the union needed
to obtain a majority of the votes cast in order to pass its mandatory
by-law amendment proposal. Labor needs strong support even for
its precatory voting initiatives, such as shareholder proposals under
Rule 14a-8, however, if it wishes to persuade a corporate board of
directors that shareholders want it to take the actions supported by
labor.
Other shareholders will be more likely to support labor's voting
initiatives when they relate to issues that have the potential to im
prove corporate performance. By contrast, when labor groups tar
get issues that concern uniquely labor-related interests, and not
307. This is true whenever labor groups do not have sufficient stock ownership at a com·
pany to bring about change solely by relying on their own voting power. In the 1996 proxy
season, for example, the Laborers submitted a proposal to Alumax. See infra app. tbl.1. At
that time, it held 320,000 shares of Alumax stock. See Alumax, Definitive Proxy Statement
(Mar. 25, 1996), available in LEXIS, Corporate Library, Edgarplus File (Film No.
96,058,465). This represented approximately 0.7% of outstanding Alumax shares. Cf.
Alumax, 1996 Form SEC 10-K (Nov. 30, 1996), available in EDGAR, Film No. 96,674,289
Other examples based on submissions noted in Table 1 include:
Baker Hughes
•

=

0.007%

Carpenters' holdings
10,000 shares (Baker Hughes Inc., Definitive
Proxy Statement 20 (Dec. 12, 1995), available in EDGAR, Film No.
-

95,601,083.)

Outstanding shares
145,149,834
{Baker Hughes Inc., 1996 SEC Form 10-K, available in EDGAR, Film
No. 96,678,190)
-

K-Mart
=

=

0.0025%
0.00008%

Laborers' holdings

-

12,500 shares

UNITE and Teamsters (combined)

390 shares (K-Mart Corp.,
Definitive Preliminary Revised Statement 21, 22 (Apr. 10, 1996),
available in EDGAR, Film No. 96,545,773)
Outstanding shares
482,151,580
(K-Mart Corp., 1996 SEC Form 10-K, available in EDGAR, Film No.
-

-

96,544,576)

WMX
=

0.03%

Operating Engineers' holdings
149,788 shares
(WMX Technologies, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement 24, available in
EDGAR, Film No. 96,540,167)
Outstanding shares
494,495,743
(WMX Technologies, Inc., 1996 SEC Form 10-K, available in EDGAR,
Film No. 96,541,025)
-

-
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more general ones of all shareholders, they will probably receive
much lower levels of shareholder voting support.
This is not surprising. Labor will have a much harder time con
vincing rational shareholders that it is in their best interests to vote
for proposals that do not on their face appear to increase the value
of a company, or that are at least value-neutral. Many shareholders

will be skeptical of proposals that appear to benefit only labor and
view them as unjustified diversions of corporate resources to a spe
cial interest group. If labor unions want to build coalitions with
other shareholders, they must be able to offer them something for
their support.
Furthermore, as noted above, many institutional shareholders
must seek to maximize value for their beneficiaries and will want to
be sure that their voting policies are directed toward approving only
those proposals that can be directly tied to shareholder value crea
tion. Labor may be able to demonstrate this connection systemati
cally for certain types of proposals sufficiently well to permit
institutional shareholders to adopt favorable voting policies.308
When labor cannot persuasively document such a connection, insti
tutions and other shareholders will need to evaluate individual la
bor initiatives on a case-by-case basis, making it unlikely that labor

will command the consistent levels of strong support that it needs to
be effective with its voting agenda. This makes it all the more criti
cal that labor couple its voting initiatives with its monitoring
strengths to bring about the increases in firm value that will per
suade other shareholders to follow its lead.
C.

Market Discipline

Market forces act as a final check upon extreme forms of labor
opportunism. If labor were to engage in a successful campaign of
opportunistic behavior and to use its voting initiatives to persuade
the board of directors to take actions that would divert substantial
value away from shareholders to labor interests, these actions
would have adverse consequences for the company in several differ
ent markets. For example, if the board of directors acted to in
crease worker pay and benefits drastically, without an offsetting
308. At present, many institutions have voting policies in favor of many traditional corpo
rate-governance shareholder proposals but not on other issues. See Bernard S. Black, Share
holder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in THE NEw PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., forthcoming 1998) (noting
that many institutional shareholders vote following the recommendation of Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS) and that ISS has guidelines about which proposals it will support,
which leads shareholder proponents to tailor their proposals to fit within these guidelines).
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increase in productivity, and this led to subpar corporate perform
ance, it would raise the cost of raising capital from future equity
sales. It would also lower the value of the corporation's existing
stock, thereby increasing the likelihood that the firm would become
a takeover target and decreasing the incentives associated with
many forms of employee stock-option plans.
Product-market competition would also punish any firm that
raised its labor costs too high. Other sellers, both domestic and in
ternational, would enjoy a cost advantage over the company. This
would place the firm at a competitive disadvantage when it sought
to sell its goods on the open market. Debt financing might also be
more difficult and costly to obtain if lenders believed that the cor
poration faced a greater risk of failure fro,m its inability to compete
effectively. Even labor might realize that it cannot divert too much
of the company's value to itself without jeopardizing the very bene
fits that it seeks: long-term job prospects and improved worker
pay.309
Of course, these market forces will not punish mild forms of
labor opportunism - only more extreme ones that adversely affect
the corporation's bottom line visibly.310 Nevertheless, they repre
sent a very real check on runaway labor opportunism in the un
likely event that the other checks discussed above do not operate
effectively.
V.

A.

Do

THESE CHECKS

WoRK.?

Current Shareholder Initiatives

When we examine labor's current shareholder initiatives in the
light of the above discussion, we can observe how these checks op
erate in practice.
1.

Traditional Corporate-Governance Proposals
Under Rule 14a-8

Labor corporate-governance proposals under Rule 14a-8 are the
most heavily used form of shareholder voting initiative. Our analy
sis suggests that this is the case for good reasons. First, many pen
sion funds have concluded that corporate-governance reforms are
309. If workers fear that changes of control will adversely affect their future employment,
they may become more reserved in their demands.
310. We should also note that, to the extent that the market for corporate control is
impeded by antitakeover barriers, such as state antitakeover statutes, this will weaken its
ability to act as a check on labor opportunism.
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value-enhancing measures and have adopted voting policies in
favor of such proposals.311 Many other shareholders appear to
share this view. Second, labor corporate-governance proposals re
ceive the highest levels of voting support of proposals made by any
sponsor group.312 Furthermore, these proposals do not seem to dis
turb the capital market, as empirical studies show that they have
either no negative effects or small positive effects on stock prices.
All of these factors tend to indicate that there is little potential for
labor opportunism with Rule 14a-8 corporate-governance proposals
and thus little need to treat them differently from other sharehold
ers' proposals.
2.

Employment-Related Voting Initiatives

Labor's 1996 voting initiatives at Albertson's and related com
panies illustrate a different configuration of these forces. These
proposals raised issues that affected labor's interests qua labor,
although the proposals themselves were for changes in corporate
governance structures. As a result, they received relatively strong
levels of shareholder support.313 By contrast, when labor makes
proposals under Rule 14a-8 that raise only employee-related issues,
those proposals obtain less support from shareholders.
While we lack hard evidence about why shareholders vote as
they do on these proposals, our analysis above is consistent with the
observed voting patterns. For example, we believe that institutional
shareholders have voting policies that require them to vote in favor
of corporate-governance proposals but not worker-oriented propos
als. Tb.us, for employment-related proposals, these shareholders
would need to consider the issues raised in these contests on a case
by-case basis, which will reduce the number of votes automatically
cast in favor of these proposals. Second, employment-related
311. See Bevis Longstreth, A Look at the SEC's Adaptation to Global Market Pressures,
33 CoLUM. J. TRANsNATI.. L. 319, 320 {1995) (noting that "the role of shareholder democracy

in the governance process . . . has expanded from a handful of Don Quixotes in earlier de
cades to the large, mostly public, pension funds engaged in shareholder activism today");
Romano, supra note 77, at 833-36 (reporting the results of a 1990 IRRC survey of voting
policies of public and private pension funds); Ryan, supra note 99, at 155-56 (reporting the
results of a 1985 IRRC survey of voting policies); supra note 308. For a detailed description
of pension funds' positions on various corporate governance proposals and the rationales
therefor, see John Lukomnik, The New York City Board of Education Pension Fund, New
York City Employee's Retirement System, New York City Fire Department Pension Fund and
New York City Police Department Pension Fund: Statement of Procedures and Policies for
Voting Proxies, in CoNTESTS FOR CoRPORATE CoNTRoL 1997, at 221, 256-68 (PLI Corp. L.
& Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-972, 1997).
312. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 6 (manuscript at 7-8).
313. See infra app. tbl.3 (summarizing these data) .
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shareholder proposals raise the possibility that labor is acting in a
self-interested manner, which should make other shareholders less
likely to support their actions. Finally, it is difficult to determine
what the impact of these proposals would be on financial and other
markets because they have not been adopted by many corporations.

H labor wants to succeed in getting these proposals adopted, it
needs to find a way to document that they have value to the firm
and to demonstrate that to other shareholders.

3.

Executive Compensation

The existing corporate-governance system in American cor
porations provides only weak oversight over the level of executive
compensation payments.314 The dramatic increases in executive
pay levels over the past five years have made them an easy target
for shareholder groups. This explains in part the popularity of
many of the "Just Vote No" campaigns.315 Labor is well positioned
to launch a joint program with other shareholders to attack these
payments.
Labor may be a better monitor of executive-compensation
levels than most shareholders. While labor unions have the same
public information regarding executive compensation that is avail
able to shareholders,316 their obligations at the bargaining table,
relative expertise on compensation-related matters, and presence in
the firm can be expected to make labor more knowledgeable than
the average shareholder about the implications for corporate per
formance of executive pay levels and the processes used to deter
mine those levels.
314. See, e.g., GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF
(1991); Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation - A Board·
Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REv. 937, 981 (1993) (suggesting board self-motivation as a solu·
tion to stimulating effective board oversight); Roger Lowenstein, On the Difficulty of Hiring
Good Help, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1997, at Cl (reporting on the overcompensation of CEOs).
In recent years, the SEC has become much more aggressive in requiring full disclosure to
shareholders of executive-compensation arrangements. See THOMAS & DIXoN, supra note 3,
§ 7 (containing a complete discussion of the SEC's executive-pay disclosure regulations).
315. See supra section III.D.
316. Although an employer is required to furnish the union with information that is rele
vant to a legitimate collective bargaining need, see Emeryville Research Ctr., Shell Dev. Co.
v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 883 {9th Cir. 1971), manager and executive compensation, unlike
bargaining unit wage and related data, would not be considered presumptively relevant and
thus the union would have the burden of justifying its request, cf. Brown Newspaper Publg.
Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 187 {1978) (relying on the fact that nonbargaining unit personnel were
similar to those in the unit in holding that the employer was required to provide compensa
tion information). In addition, there likely would be confidentiality issues raised by an em·
ployer facing such a request.
AMERICAN EXECUTIVES
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As noted in Part II, unions are well versed in the incentives or lack thereof - incorporated in most compensation structures
used to pay executives. Moreover, when faced with information re
garding executive compensation, unions' general knowledge of
compensation mechanisms makes them better equipped to decipher
reported information and draw conclusions regarding its implica
tions.317 Unions' knowledge of compensation generally also allows
them to understand that a number of systems are not reported in
materials distributed to shareholders.
Labor has made use of its knowledge of these issues. For exam
ple, on April

10, 1997, the AFL-CIO launched Executive PayWatch,

a web site on the Internet, as part of an effort to bring issues related
to executive compensation to the attention of the public.318 Execu
tive PayWatch allows individuals to compare their own salaries with
those of corporate executives of ninety-six firms.319 The site also
provides information on how shareholders can decipher proxy
statements and use their proxies and the shareholder-proposal
mechanism to encourage change.320
Given its position as a potential monitor of corporate manage
ment on executive compensation, will labor act in shareholders'
best interests in pushing for changes in the existing system? At one
level, any time that labor can form a coalition with shareholders to
reduce management's share of the corporate income creates the po
tential for a joint benefit for both groups. Thus, to muster share
holder support for a campaign to reduce executive compensation,
labor will need to use its expertise and knowledge regarding com-

317. Concern over shareholders' ability to become informed about executive compensa
tion led the SEC in February of 1992 to announce new reporting requirements. See Breeden
Announces SEC Initiative on Executive Compensation Issues, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA),
Feb. 21, 1992. For a discussion of the new requirements, see TuoMAS & DIXON, supra note 3,
§ 7.
318. See Executive PayWatch (visited Dec. 5, 1997) <http://aflcio.paywatch.org/ceopay>.
In addition, the Teamsters' Union has issued its own study of the effectiveness of corporate
directors that attaches significant weight to corporate performance and its relationship to
executive pay. See OFFICE OF CoRP. AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL BRHD. OF TEAMSTERS,
AMEruCA's LEAST VALUABLE DIRECTORS (1997); Dobrzynski, supra note 10.
319. See Executive Paywatch, supra note 318. The site also encourages individuals to:
"call on the regulators" to lobby for full disclosure (noting that severance benefits and de
ferred compensation are not reported); "take it to Congress" and support Representative
Sabo's bill that would "cap the business tax deductibility of all executive compensation . . . to
25 times that of the lowest paid full-time worker in the same firm"; and "rally your coworkers
and the community." Id. It also includes a sample e-mail message to send to senators and
representatives. See id.
320.

See id.

1088

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1018

pensation to demonstrate how executive compensation systems can
negatively affect shareholder value.321
Lowering the rate of growth of - or absolute levels of - man
agement compensation risks a reduction in the value of the corpo
ration for all participants, however, if good managers leave the firm
to go elsewhere. Management can argue that labor is attacking its
compensation levels as a means of creating pressure on the com
pany to accommodate labor interests at shareholders' expense. Un
less labor can demonstrate that this is incorrect, many shareholders
may choose to support management rather than risk the loss of val
uable managerial talent.
B.

In

Implications of Labor-Shareholder Activism for the Debate
over Director Fiduciary Duties
Oliver Williamson's well-known article, Corporate Govern

ance, 322 he argues that the board of directors of a corporation
should have a fiduciary duty only to the company's shareholders.
Shareholders need board representation to protect their investment
because they are the only "voluntary constituency whose relation
with the corporation does not come up for periodic renewal," be
cause their investment is not associated with any particular asset
and hence difficult to protect, and because they face a significant
risk of having their firm-specific investment expropriated.323 Other
forms of contractual protection, in Williamson's view, are inade
quate to safeguard shareholders' interests.
By contrast, Williamson claims that the board of directors
should not have a fiduciary duty to other constituencies, such as
workers, because those groups have the ability to seek explicit or
implicit contractual protections of their rights. Workers can act to
protect their firm-specific investments through explicit contracts,
such as collective bargaining agreements.324 Where such explicit
contractual protections are unavailable, workers can negotiate im
plicit contracts with firms to protect their firm-specific investments.
Although firms have incentives to renege ex post on these implicit
321. Labor needs to avoid presenting executive compensation solely as an issue of fairness to workers, thereby reflecting the adversarial side of labor-management relations.
322. Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YA.LE LJ. 1197 (1984).
323. Id. at 1210.
324. See id. at 1208. Labor representation on the board of directors might be necessary
for informational purposes to prevent labor agreements from drifting out of alignment. See
id. at 1208-09.
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agreements, reputational considerations may prevent this type of
firm opportunism.325
Marleen O'Connor has used Williamson's transaction-cost anal
ysis to suggest that boards of directors should be required to con
sider other interests beyond those of shareholders.326 In particular,
she argues that we need to expand directors' fiduciary duties to
consider worker interests explicitly as well as shareholder inter
ests.327 She claims that labor needs board representation in order
to protect its firm-specific investments.328 O'Connor believes that
the firm's reputational interest in protecting workers' implicit con
tracts

gives

them inadequate

protection.329

She proposes

a

mandatory regime of "neutral referee" directors to protect employ
ees from opportunistic conduct by firms.330
Our analysis suggests that if unions are successful in mobilizing
shareholder support for their voting initiatives, they may be able to
get boards to consider labor's interests as part of their processes of
considering shareholder interests without any dramatic changes in
legal rules. If this is correct, it gives labor another method of seek
ing to protect labor's firm-specific investments and implicit con
tracts, as labor and other shareholders press management to keep
its word.

Furthermore, it suggests that labor qua shareholder

should use its monitoring abilities to keep itself and other share
holders advised about board actions that affect workers' firm.
specific investments and, more generally, firm value.
The limitations on labor-shareholder activism explored above
also suggest the limits on labor's ability to use shareholder activism
as a means of protecting its firm-specific investment. This will be
easiest when labor can demonstrate that protecting its interests will

be value enhancing - or at least value neutral - for all sharehold
ers. This would enable it to marshal enough institutional and other
shareholder support to press the board of directors to take specific
actions, or at least more generally to consider labor's interests when
325. See Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the
Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE LJ. 173, 176 (arguing that

nonshareholder groups can best protect their firm-specific investments by negotiating con
tractual provisions); cf. Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REy. 899, 910
(1993) (suggesting that reputational considerations may help to enforce implicit employment
agreements).
326. See O'Connor, supra note 325, at 946-65.
327. See id. at 955.
328. See id.
329. See id. at 911.
330. See id. at 955-65.

Michigan Law Review

1090

[Vol. 96:1018

it acts. This discussion between labor and management could take
place using the same informal means of communication enjoyed by
other institutional shareholders or, if that is unavailable for labor's
use, by more formal methods.
CONCLUSION
Labor unions are aggressively using their ownership power to
push corporate-governance reforms. So far, much of their activity
is tactical. Lasting changes in corporate governance can occur if
unions develop a more strategic model of their role in corporate
governance.

A strategic model would require unions to concentrate

on areas where their interests coincide with other shareholders and
where they can demonstrate that their actions will increase firm
value. This requires that labor unions adopt a platform of maximiz
ing long-term growth for shareholders and other stakeholders, as
well as for themselves.

In

particular, unions must convince other

shareholders that they are acting in areas where they have an infor
mational advantage about the corporation's and management's op
erations. If labor can demonstrate to other shareholders that it is
using its monitoring advantages to take actions to increase firm
value by policing management shirking and reducing the agency
costs of equity, then other shareholders will be more willing to fol
low its lead in future voting initiatives. This opens up the possibility
that labor union shareholders could reinvigorate some currently in
effectual corporate-governance systems. These might include the
policing of securities fraud and other types of corporate misconduct
through the use of existing litigation techniques.

In

taking on this monitoring role, however, unions transform

themselves as well. They are already becoming sophisticated play
ers in corporate-governance battles. These battles emphasize effi
ciency and firm value. By aligning themselves with shareholders in
these battles, unions inevitably shift from an antagonistic player to
a strategically cooperative player in corporate governance.
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APPENDIX
TABLE

1996

1

LABOR SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

Company

Sponsor

Proposal

Status

Albertson's
Alumax

Teamsters
Laborers
Laborers
Teamsters
UBCJA
LongView

Repeal classified board
Repeal classified board
Repeal classified board
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Restrict nonemployee
director pensions
No director liability exemption
No director liability exemption
Repeal classified board
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Cumulative voting
Directors/candidates attend
annual meeting
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Confidential voting
Repeal classified board
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Redeem or vote on poison pill

32.3%
68.6% (p)
withdrawn
withdrawn
73.4% (p)

Aiza

American Stores
Baker Hughes
Baltimore Gas
& Electric
Bankers Trust NY
Bausch & Lomb
Bell Atlantic

Laborers
UBCJA
Operating Engineers
Teamsters
CWA
C\VA-Hammond

Boeing
Cablevision
Caterpillar
Chase Manhattan
Chevron
Compaq Computer
Conrail
Consolidated
Natural Gas
Dow Jones

Teamsters
Service Employees
UBCJA
Teamsters
UBCJA
Teamsters
Service Employees

Eastman Kodak
Fleming
Forest Laboratories
GTE

Teamsters
Teamsters
Service Employees
!BEW-Langlais
!BEW-Davis
Teamsters

General Electric

LongView
IAPE

C\VA
General Instruments
Houston Industries
Kimberly-Clark
Kmart

Knight-Ridder
Lockheed Martin
Louisiana Pacific
McGraw-Hill
Mead
Melville
Mercantile Stores
Merrill Lynch
3M
Mobil
NorAm Energy
Panhandle Eastern

Penney (J.C.)

Service Employees
Teamsters
UBCJA
Laborers
Teamsters,UNITE
Teamsters,UNITE
Teamsters,UNITE
Laborers
Operating Engineers
LongView
Laborers
Paperworkers
UBCJA
Laborers
LongView
Laborers
Teamsters
Service Employees
LongView
OCAW-Miller
OCAW-Rule
OCAW-Sipe
OCAW-Smith
OCAW-Merrill

UNITE

Redeem or vote on poison pill
Allow union representative
on board
Cumulative voting
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Cap executive compensation
Cap executive compensation
Restrict nonemployee
director pensions
Restrict nonemployee
director pensions
Repeal classified board [1]
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Repeal classified board
Cumulative voting
Repeal classified board
Restrict nonemployee
director pensions
Study sale of company
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Vote on future poison pills
Repeal classified board
Repeal classified board
Repeal classified board
Vote on future golden parachutes
Repeal classified board
Repeal classified board
Repeal classified board
Reincorporate in Minnesota
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Vote on future golden parachutes
Confidential voting
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Vote on future golden parachutes
Repeal classified board
Repeal fair price
Redeem or vote on poison pill

not in proxy
, withdrawn
withdrawn
not in proxy
omitted (c-10)
not in proxy
24.7%
withdrawn
withdrawn
49.2%
withdrawn
not in proxy
omitted (c-10)
withdrawn
50.8%
omitted (c-8)
27.3%
64.0% (p)
not in proxy
22.4%
22.1%
omitted (c-11)
not in proxy
86.2% (p)
withdrawn
withdrawn
29.3%
43.1%
29.8%
13.0%
39.2%
not in proxy
43.2%
withdrawn
withdrawn
50.8%
withdrawn
30.4%
32.2%
2.3%
withdrawn
withdrawn
not in proxy
not in proxy
44.6%
51.0%
49.3%
40.6%
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not in proxy

Pfizer

Service Employees

Redeem or vote on poison pill

Philip Morris

Operating Engineers

Restrict nonemployee

Rite Aid

LongView

Redeem or vote on poison pill

[2]

Sears, Roebuck

Teamsters

Separate chair and CEO

withdrawn

Sprint

!BEW

Restrict nonemployee

CWA

Create shareholder committee

SuperYalu

LongView

Redeem or vote on poison pill

64.8% (p)

Tenneco

UBCJA

No director liability exemption

withdrawn

director pensions

director pensions

withdrawn

34.8%
6.6%

Teamsters

Redeem or vote on poison pill

37.4%

T11ne Warner

Teamsters

Separate chair and CEO

17.9%

Toys 'R' Us

Teamsters

Confidential voting

not in proxy

Transamerica

Teamsters

Redeem or vote on poison pill

32.2%
withdrawn

Union Pacific

UBCJA

Repeal classified board

Unocal

Service Employees

Use Council of Institutional

Teamsters

Separate chair and CEO

Upjohn

Operating Engineers

Restrict nonemployee

WMX Technologies

Operating Engineers

Prohibit director conflict

Teamsters

Repeal classified board

45.6%

Wellman

UNITE

Redeem or vote on poison pill

44.6%

Weyerhauser

LongView

Redeem or vote on poison pill

52.3% (p)

Operating Engineers

Repeal classified board

17.7%

LongView

Repeal classified board

[3]

Investors' board policies

director pensions
of interest

omitted (c-10)
withdrawn
withdrawn
30.7%

Wheelabrator
Technologies
Woolworth
[1]

This proposal was supported by management.

this proposal passed, but gave no vote counts.

[2]

The company indicated in its SEC filings that

[3]

The annual meeting was held June 13, 1996. Information regarding status was not found.

Legend:
Passed

(p)
CWA

Communication Workers of America

IAPE

Independent Association of Publishers' Employees

!BEW

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

Laborers

Laborers' International Union of North America

LongView

Amalgamated Bank of New York LongView Collective Investment Fund

OCAW

Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union

Operating
Engineers
Paperworkers

International Union of Operating Engineers
United Paperworkers International Union

Service
Employees

Service Employees International Union

Teamsters

International Brotherhood of Teamsters

UBCJA

Pension funds affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America

UNITE
Source:

Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (formerly ACfWU)
Checklist of 1996 Shareholder Proposals, supra note 114, supplemented with information from
companies' 10-Q filings where data on shareholder votes were unavailable at the time the IRRC
Bulletin was published. Where votes were added, they were calculated as (for)/(for + against)
(abstentions were not included).
We note that there are some inconsistencies between the information contained in the company's
proxy statements and that in the IRRC Bulletin. In our tables, we have chosen to use the IRRC
data where available in order to maintain consistency.
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TABLE 2

1997

LABOR SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

Company

Sponsor

Proposal

AT&T
Albertson's
Amoco
Ashland
Baltimore Gas & Electric
Bell Atlantic

CWA-lrvine
Teamsters
Service Employees
OCAW-Brown
LongView
CWA-Rucker
Operating Engineers
Teamsters
Paperworkers
UAW-Lazarowitz
Teamsters
LongView
LongView
UBCJA
Teamsters
Operating Engineers

Cumulative voting
Repeal classified board
Separate chair and CEO
Allow an employee on the board
Restrict nonemployee director pensions
Cumulative voting
Cumulative voting
Repeal classified board
Repeal classified board
Restrict nonemployee director pensions
Separate chair and CEO
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Independent nominating committee
Repeal classified board
Cumulative voting
Redeem or vote on poison pill (By
Law)
Repeal classified board
Vote on future golden parachutes
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Vote on future golden parachutes
Limit deferred compensation/OBRA
Link director pay to performance
Repeal classified board
Separate chair and CEO
Separate chair and CEO
Vote on future golden parachutes
Link executive pay to overseas
labor standards
Confidential voting
No option cash in within 6 mos.
of major layoff
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Restrict nonemployee director pensions
Limit deferred compensation/OBRA
Independent compensation committee
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Link director pay to performance
Repeal classified board
Cap executive pay to employee
pay increase
Restrict nonemployee director pensions
Repeal classified board
Limit relatives on the board
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Repeal classified board
Repeal classified board
Repeal classified board
Repeal classified board
Repeal classified board
Prohibit director conflict of interest
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Repeal classified board

Boise Cascade
Caraustar Industries
Caterpillar
Chase Manhattan
Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Dayton Hudson
DuPont(E.I.) de Nemours
Eastman Kodak
Enron
Fleming
Frontier
Fruit of the Loom
GATX
General Electric
General Motors
Georgia Pacific
Home Depot
Illinois Tool Works
International Paper
Limited

Teamsters
UBCJA
C\VA
LongView
Paperworkers
Teamsters
Teamsters
UBCJA
Teamsters
Paperworkers
UBCJA
LongView

Merck
Mobil

UBCJA
Teamsters

Monsanto
Penney (J.C.)
PepsiCo
Philip Morris
Quaker Oats
RJR Nabisco
Sears, Roebuck
Sprint

UBCJA
UBCJA
Teamsters
Teamsters
LongView
Teamsters
Teamsters
CWA-Speight

Stone Container
TRW
Tenneco
Texaco
Tribune
Union Camp
Unisys
WMX Technologies
Westinghouse Electric
Weyerhauser
\Vtllamette Industries

IBEW
Teamsters
Paperworkers
Operating Engineers
Teamsters
Teamsters
Tuamsters
Paperworkers
Operating Engineers
Operating Engineers
Operating Engineers
LongView
Paperworkers

Legend:

CWA

IBEW
Laborers
LongView
OCAW

Communication Workers of America
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
Laborers' International Union of North America
Amalgamated Bank of New York LongView Collective Investment
Fund
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union
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Operating

International Union of Operating Engineers

Engineers

United Paperworkers International Union

Paperworkers
Service

Service Employees International Union

Employees
Teamsters

International Brotherhood of Teamsters

UAW

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agriculturnl
Implement Workers of America

UBCJA

Pension funds affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America

Source:

Checklist of1997 Shareholder Proposals, supra note 109.
TABLE 3
ACTIVITIES OF LoCAL

99R,

UNITED FOOD AND

COMMERCIAL WORKERS
1996 Season
Company

Proposnl

Status

Albertson's

Confidentinl voting

21.4%

Idaho Power

Confidentinl voting

14.1%

Pier 1 Imports

Confidentinl voting

44.6%
.1%

Confidentinl voting

Pope & Tnlbot
Questar
Tektronics

Vote on future golden parachutes

not presented

Confidential voting

37.9%

Vote on future golden parachutes

22.0%

Repeal classified board

34.3%

Vote on future golden parachutes
Redeem or vote on poison pill
Source:

8.8%
34.0%

IRRC, 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 4.

1997 Season
Company

Proposal

Notes

Albertson's

Confidential voting

company advised UFCW
[1]

Boeing

Repeal classified board

another identical proposnl under 14a-8 in prol!}'
material [2]

will not present at meeting

Boise Cascade

Repenl classified board

Heritage Media

Confidential voting

Pier 1 Imports

Redeem or vote on poison pill

union has indicated it
[3]

Questar

Repeal classified board

no mention in proJ!Y materials that the UFCW locnl
intends to present a proposal [4]

will not independently solicit

TIS Mortgage
[1]
[2]

Albertson's, Inc., Definitive ProJ!Y Statement
97,576,512.

29 (Apr. 8, 1997),

available in

EDGAR, Film No.

Boeing Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Mar. 14, 1997), available in EDGAR, Film No. 97,556,332.

[3]

Questar Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Apr. 7, 1997), available in EDGAR, Film No. 97,575,768.

[4]

TIS Mortage Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Apr.
97,585,820.

Source:

CoUNCIL OF lNSTL. INvEsroRS LEITER,

23, 1997)

available in

EDGAR, Film No.

supra note 26, at 2; preliminary prol!}' statements.

